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To Professor Vincenzo Patalano
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Setting up a statue to Beccaria is equivalent to abolishing the scaffold.
If, once set up, the scaffold came up from the ground, the
statue would go back into it
(Victor H, )
The grateful Nation raises a Monument to C B,
to the first who dared to ask lawmakers and peoples to abolish
bloody torture, in forceful and heeded words.
(Pasquale Stanislao M, )
. An extract from the letter sent by Victor Hugo on th March  in thanks for
being nominated as a component of the commission called upon to examine and approve
the project for a statue dedicated to the memory of Cesare Beccaria to be set up in Milan.
. This is the opening of the speech by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini Given upon invitation
of the committee at the solemn inauguration of the monument to Cesare Beccaria in Milan on
March th .
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Introduction
The death penalty is a subject usually considered to belong to the
field of criminal justice alone; a field which considers it necessary to
include the death penalty among the punishments available within
a given legal system, with the sole purpose of conferring adequate
effectiveness and greater firmness to the punitive response. And yet
we are still seeking to understand the reasons for, and the degree
of, this punitive response, as Eugen Wiesnet says: for millennia men
have been punishing one another - and for millennia they have been
wondering why they do it.
The question is, in my opinion, open to a possibly different reading,
which not only links the aspect of the justification of one type of
sanction to the scenario of penal legislation, but projects it onto the
broader sphere of the relationship between the powers of the modern
State and the fundamental rights of the citizens, and especially the
rights that the State is called to exercise in relation to the citizens and
the constraints impinging on the State because of the constitutional
rights these citizens enjoy.
In reality, capital punishment can not only provide the opportunity
to look again at the conception of punishment that leads a legislator
at a given moment in history to envisage it as the culmination of a
punitive system, but also to re-examine the logic that can lead to it
. E. Wiesnet, Die verratene Versohnung: zum Verhaltnis von Christentum und Strafe
(Dusseldorf: Patmos, ).
. P. S. M, “therefore, I will not seek to understand whether the inviolability of
human life should be proclaimed as an absolute principle; or whether society has the right
to take away that which it cannot create nor render, that it to say, the gift of life reserved to
the Creator as is the arcane mystery of death; I shall not ask whether the human personality
can be reduced from end to means; nor whether the life of a man may legitimately be
extinguished in any other case than that of the current and necessary defence of the self,
to conclude that the whole of society in no wise can ever find itself in such circumstances
before a delinquent now harmless and powerless to threaten it with extreme and awful
danger” (Per l’abolizione della pena di morte: discorsi del deputato Mancini pronunciati alla
Camera dei deputati nelle tornate del  e  febbraio e  marzo , Turin: Botta, , p. ).

 Introduction
being considered the prerogative of a State to use it to affirm its own
sovereignty and to be able to safeguard society from crime.
In ancient literature the right to punish was grafted onto the strati-
fied basis of a variety of justifications centred on the “bond of obedien-
ce” that a citizen owed to the organisation of the State to which he
belonged. The evolution of the relationship between the State and the
citizen changes in exactly the same way as the changes in the social
and economic order, and with them the need to provide, preventively
and constantly, new rules of behaviour to adopt, and as a precaution,
new definitions of criminal acts and new forms of punishment.
Radical change in the punitive relationship therefore becomes the
new focal point in the theoretical debate on the death penalty, because
time and the new balance of power have altered the importance of
individual subjective positions, and the State today does not hold a
position of pre-eminence over the person. In fact, the human being is
presented as the bearer of new rights and new powers in a way totally
unknown in the past. In order to create a new and modern balance in
the relationship between State and citizens, it is necessary to turn to
the established fundamental values and constitutional rights, which
are the means for solving conflicts between concurrent rights.
Today, reparation of a wrong through the satisfaction of the archaic
“blood debt” comes up against the fundamental values and human
rights covered by the Conventions, at State and supranational level,
which, being inviolable and constitutive, tolerate neither abuse nor
temporary suppression.
The need that organised States have to defend this prerogative cer-
tainly constitutes one of the reasons justifying recourse to the death
penalty. It remains however to be considered under which conditions
the concurrent rights which tend to go against the death penalty or
which make it useless or inopportune are to be considered relevant.
. P. E, Delle origini storiche del diritto di punire. Prelezione all’Università di Bologna
nel novembre  (Bologna: Stab.Tip. G. Monti, ).
. P. E, “the restraining effect which religious and moral beliefs have on human
passions would be insufficient to guarantee the peaceful coexistence of men in the absence
of laws” (Della pena capitale, Venezia: Forni, ; repr. Pordenone: Forni, , p. ).
. L. F, “Thus, the philosophical basis for the death penalty is an absolute
rock, which identifies with the very ethical and political basis of law and the State and, in
general, civil co-existence” (Principia juris. Teoria del diritto e della democrazia. . Teoria della
democrazia, Rome-Bari: Laterza, , p. ).
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In this way, the free and arbitrary exercise of power is surrogated by a
legitimate right to punish, whose degree of importance is sanctioned
by a specific limit, consisting in the right of one who, despite viola-
ting criminal law, must face sanctions which are, however, able to
guarantee the full respect of his/her fundamental rights.
A study cannot, then, limit itself to examining only the purpose
of the penalty, but must involve the rules that govern the legitimate
faculty to resort to this form of punishment, to analyse and compare
the reasons that justify recourse to the death penalty, considering it
the free exercise of a legitimate faculty, and the arguments, on the
other hand, that reject it.
If the paradigm is represented by the requirements of the justifica-
tion of having death as a form of punishment, naturally the discussion
of the issue legitimately draws on tradition. If, however, the paradigm
changes and the object of the investigation becomes that of legitima-
ting the State to exercise the right to punish by death, the principle of the
validity of juridical reasoning changes. It will not be a question of sim-
ply considering the congruity of the foundations of the death penalty
with the criteria legitimating the ultimate purpose of the criminal
justice system as a whole, but of assessing under which conditions,
and in accordance with which concurrent rights and duties, the State
can make recourse to the exercise of a faculty which comes within the
overall framework of State powers and which, in particular, is charac-
terised by the right to punish. And the right to punish, it may appear
paradoxical, in contemporary legal culture is fully complementary
to the right to adopt provisions of clemency, which means giving up
the exercise of punitive power as a compensatory expedient in the
criminal justice system, or as a different form of the right to punish
that emphasises the aspect of the social integration of the offender
rather than that of definitive aﬄictiveness.
It is perhaps time to examine again from the exegetic point of view
the statement - which at the time appeared cryptic - used by Manzini
in his main work: “The question of the death penalty is in the nature
. G. V, La potestà punitiva (Turin: Utet, ).
. On this subject see the extensive investigation carried out by V. Maiello, Clemenza
e sistema penale. Amnistia e indulto dall’indulgentia principis all’idea dello scopo (Naples: ESI,
).
 The right of a state to punish by death
of criminal justice policy, and not philosophy, and still less that of
criminal ‘law’”.
. V. M, Trattato di diritto penale italiano (Turin: Utet, ), vol. III, p. .
Chapter I
A necessary observation on methodology
A modern view of the rule of law must focus on the issue of the nature
and value of the category of the fundamental rights and duties that
link the citizen to the State he or she belongs to.
In the complex network of the system of rights the problematic
and current question arises of whether a State can dispose of the life
of its citizens when crimes of such gravity and ferocity have been
committed as to deserve no less than the death of the offender. It is
natural, however, that only if the right to life is considered alienable
can it become the object of such radical criminal policy. It very often
happens that in the name of substantive justice there is a clash between
the principles informing the system, so, even when the right to life is
considered absolutely inalienable as far as the holder of this right is
concerned, it may be violated by the State.
Ultimately, a State based on the rule of law can be justified onto-
logically by a systematic order of principles and rules based on the
coherence of the values which it expressly recognises as fundamental.
When the State is formally defined by its law, i.e. the legitimation of
legal categories guaranteeing the equal treatment of citizens, values
must be considered either alienable or inalienable to the same de-
gree, in order to avoid even a single departure giving rise to others,
. N. L, Politische Planung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag), ; P. Costa and
D. Zolo (eds), Lo Stato di diritto. Storia, teoria, critica (Milan: Feltrinelli, ). On the evolu-
tionary aspects of the rule of law and, above all, on the relationships of contiguity between
law and right, see E. Forsthoff (ed.), Rechtstaat im wandel (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, );
P. C, La civiltà del delitto. Il liberalismo della pena di morte (Naples: ESI, ), p. .
. It has been sustained that modern natural law has been wholly replaced by the
idea of the Rule of Law which, in reality, manifests itself as the rule of the rights of
citizenship. For all the relevant legal and political implications, where the centre of the new
framework of the system is parliamentary representation, see J. H, Faktizitat und
Geltung. Beitrage zur Diskurstheorie des Recht und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Suhrkamp:
Frankfurt am Main, ).

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thus causing irreparable damage to the integrity of the very value of
uniformity and coherence upon which the system is based.
There is, however, no coherence when it is deemed that life may
sometimes be alienable if it is a matter for the State to decide and
absolutely inalienable if it is the person who enjoys human rights who
makes the decision (see the cases of Welby and of Englaro). In fact
precisely the hypothesis of the impossibility of the right holder giving
up the right to his/her own life, as in the case of euthanasia where the
consenting party may be charged with murder, highlights even more
the importance of the values at stake, which are particularly high up
in the hierarchy, like the dignity of the human person and human
solidarity. In this way, intangibility and inviolability prevent life, along
with the other rights on a similar level, being considered different
according to the circumstances a right holder finds him/her-self in.
The above example provides the reasonable demonstration that it
is precisely within this conceptual incoherence that the justification of
the death penalty lurks, and paradoxically, within a State founded on
the law and rights.
.. Guidelines for an epistemological investigation
The relationship between the State’s right to punish and the theme of
death is certainly ancient and it is essentially based on the categorical
necessity to guarantee civil co-existence, preventing individuals from
taking justice into their own hands. On this point, Mario Sbriccoli
affirmed that “The history of ‘criminal law’ can be thought of as
. On the subject of the alienable nature of rights and especially on their limits, or
their alienability insofar as they are connected to the constituent pact and so to the same
fundamental principles of living in a modern community, see the broader picture presented
by G. R, ‘La disponibilità dei diritti fondamentali e i limiti della dignità’, Riv. di Dir. civ.,
VI,  (), . The subject of human dignity will be addressed specifically later on. Cf.
also L. F, Principia juris. Teoria del diritto e della democrazia. . Teoria del diritto, p.
.
. For a clearly authoritarian definition of the exercise of rights (imposed, not negotia-
ted) by a State, cf. F. D’Alessio, ‘Lo Stato fascista come stato di diritto’, in Various Authors,
Scritti giuridici in onore di Santi Romano (Padua: Cedam, ), vol. I, pp. -.
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the long history of a move away from vengeance”. There was in
fact a moment in history when the link that bound the avenger and
the injured party was broken, because the dichotomy comporting
the duty of the injured party to obtain satisfaction for the wrong
suffered gave way to a true right in the name of justice. This happens
because the State assumes among its basic functions that of governing
criminal policy, thus opening up to a new and different form of social
control: “City governments felt that criminal justice was a decisive
means of government and that there was no sense in leaving it to
the initiative of the victims alone”. So every organised human co-
existence must be able to count on adequate dissuasive measures and
on forms of punishment that guarantee and re-establish the balance
of the objective right that has been violated. These are the reasons
why “criminal and punitive policies are oriented towards one purpose.
They use the law, and chiefly the criminal law, as a means to an end.
. For this work I have considered it interesting to follow both the content and the
model of analysis developed by Sbriccoli. My intent is to reflect on a possible different
systematic view of the issue of capital punishment, where the idea of its purpose seems
to prevail: M. S, ‘Giustizia criminale’, in M. Fioravanti (ed.), Lo Stato moderno in
Europa. Istituzioni e diritto (Rome-Bari: Laterza, ), pp. -. The fascination that this
subject holds is so strong that the words of G. Bettiol appear prophetic: “every scholar of
criminal law at some point in his career finds himself addressing the problem (fundamental
to our discipline) of the death penalty, still allowed in many, perhaps too many, countries
despite opposition not only from the academic and political communities, but also from a
large part of public opinion” (’Sulla pena di morte’, Riv. it. Dir. e proc. pen., , , ).
. On this and on the opposing sides, with the need for vengeance on the one hand
and the rights of the injured party on the other, see Antonio Rosmini and all the associated
theoretical discussion: cf. F. G, ‘Il diritto di punire nel pensiero di Antonio Rosmini
e Raffaele Garofalo’, Riv. dir. penitenziario (); U. Spirito, Storia del diritto penale italiano
da Cesare Beccaria ai nostri giorni (Milan: Sansoni, ), p. .
. M. S, ‘Giustizia criminale’, p. ; G. D. P, ‘Il problema della pena di
morte e la sua attualità’, in Studi in onore di Biagio Petrocelli, vol. III (Milan: Giuffrè, ).
There is a fairly extensive literature, especially from the UK and the USA, on the concept
of social control, recognising that the social role of punishment has diverse characteristics.
In other words, social control also includes the social role of punishment or the role of
the penalty (although not only these), cf. S. Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime and
Classification (Cambridge: Polity Press, ).
. V. M, Perché punire. Il collasso della giustizia penale (Macerata: Liberilibri, ),
p. ; P. N, ‘Le sanzioni criminali nel pensiero di Enrico Ferri e nel momento
storico attuale’, Riv. it. dir. pen. (), ; L. E, La funzione della pena: il commiato da Kant
e da Hegel (Milan: Giuffrè, ); L. M, Prospettive dell’idea dello “scopo” nella teoria
della pena (Naples: Jovene, ); M. R, Il problema della pena. Alcuni profili relativi allo
sviluppo della riflessione sulla pena (Turin: Giappichelli, ).
 The right of a state to punish by death
This end is always to ‘protect’ (mainly legal goods), but it is not
necessarily or only an end concerning justice. Criminal law is, in fact,
also used as an instrument to fight for the defence and harmony of
society”.
This passage becomes the focal point of the new vision of the State
monopoly on the rights of the citizens and private vengeance, with all
its most cruel nuances, which history has accrued over the centuries,
giving way to punishment devised by an organised human commu-
nity in a political community (that is, a community organised as a
‘polis’). In this way the lex talionis constitutes the first point of tran-
sition from a situation of personal will, even if expressed by a clan,
to a phase in which punishment was organised in accordance with
rational characteristics and aims, inspired by an orientation towards a
model of punitive symmetry making up the true point of transition in
the direction of a retributional aim (or “just deserts” as the English
. As stated significantly by M. D, “Criminal policy is a broader concept than that
of punishment: it focuses on prevention, neutralising or also reducing the causes and the
occasions of criminality, but also its consequences. It therefore includes all the instruments,
legal (of all branches of the legal systems) and otherwise, i.e., social, political, economic,
moral, etc., oriented to that purpose. All the institutions are involved, individual private
associations and the citizens as individuals. It is therefore not limited to the State or only
to some of its organs (also the judiciary, and not only the politicians who implement it).
The repressive aspect of criminal law, however, is only one component of criminal policy:
it is limited to ‘criminal’ policy (punitive-criminal), which represents only one part of
criminal justice, and its government is the exclusive duty of Parliament” (’Il diritto penale
di fronte al “nemico”’, Cass. pen., , , - , ); cf. also M. B, “in reality,
the education of communal Italian society also means an education towards vengeance”
(La giustizia nell’Italia moderna, Rome-Bari: Laterza, , p. ).
. M. S: “It is postulated that the main wrong is not that suffered by the
victim, but that inflicted on public order, and thus on society, of which politics or power
declare themselves representatives and guarantors, as there is the intention to punish the
least resistance to the monopoly, claimed in the same way, on the legitimate use of force”
(’“Storia del diritto italiano”: articolazioni disciplinari vecchie e nuove’, , now in Storia
del diritto penale e della giustizia, Milan: Giuffrè, , vol. II, p. ); cf. also E. C,
Uccidere per punire: come e perché, ieri e oggi, Introduction to V. H, Contro la pena di morte
(Milan: Mondadori, ).
. M. S: “In a framework characterised by the clash between the interests of
private individuals and families, or between the ‘general’ good and ‘other’ goods, justice
was in the same way accomplished through vengeance or reprisals, by transaction or
peace, and only as a last resort, or in the absence of anything else, by punishment” (’“Vidi
communiter observari”: l’emersione di un ordine penale pubblico nelle città italiane del
secolo XIII’, , now in Storia del diritto penale e della giustizia, Milan: Giuffrè, , vol. I,
p. ).
. A necessary observation on methodology 
say). It should be added, if only to give the lie to a meaningless
preconception, that it is clearly possible to distinguish between the
concept of retribution and that of vengeance, because in the latter
there is a disproportion between the wrong committed and the degree
of punishment. A canonical example of resorting to vengeance, or
at any rate the asymmetrical application of a punishment, is to be
found in the Code of Hammurabi. The text of the ancient stele, in fact,
is deeply iniquitous since, depending on the social class of the offen-
der, different criteria of attribution were applied in the relationship
between the gravity of the offence and the nature and degree of the
penalty inflicted.
In effect, the vendetta reiterates the question of unreasonable re-
prisal after a wrong has been suffered: “vengeance is automatic, ven-
geance is an exaggeration, vengeance is inhuman”. The retribution
of the lex talionis calls to mind a well defined principle of correlation
between compensatory measures - ill-conceived, and ill-rooted also in
the traditions of jurisprudence in ancient law. Chapter  of Exodus
states that if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye
for eye, tooth for tooth, hand due to hand, foot for foot, wound for
wound, bruise for bruise. In this way the hostility once shown by the
. As W. I. Miller observes, according to the Biblical formulation, the talion places at
the centre of everything, and before all things, the body, life, eyes, hands, the teeth of a
man - as a measure of absolute value (Eye for an Eye, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, ).
. As E. Bloch observes, clearly one answers a blow with a blow. Punishment is
vengeance; that is how it began, all the rest came later or became a pretext: an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth, better yet if there is a supplement - a rogue takes them as a rogue
and a half (Naturrecht und menschliche Wurde, Frankfurt am Maine: Suhrkamp, ).
. A. M, Lezioni di Istituzioni di diritto e procedura penale, collected and written by
Francesco Tritto (Bari: Cacucci, ), p. .
. The different values of the two concepts are once again clearly distinguished by
G. B: “A wrong idea of the problem is perpetuated when one states that with the
notion of retribution the foundations or the reasoning for the penalty itself are established
in terms of vengeance. Vengeance is the expression of a reaction by the injured party -
often disproportionate to the offence - whereby a phenomenon is presented and inter-
preted in purely individualistic and subjective terms, a phenomenon which is of a social
and therefore collective nature, which cannot thus be left to the will of the individual.
Vengeance externalises a phenomenon of terrible desire where reason should prevail in
order to avoid bellum omnium contra omnes” (’Punti fermi in tema di pena retributiva’, in
Scritti giuridici in onore di Alfredo De Marsico, ed. by Prof. Giovanni Leone, Milan: Giuffrè,
, vol. I, p. ).
. The Bible, Exodus, ch. , -, emphasises the symmetrical relationship between
 The right of a state to punish by death
criminal towards the family of the victim, making him an “enemy”
to be eliminated, is transformed into the hostility that the criminal
bears against organised society and that makes him, in his turn, an
“enemy” to be eliminated. In a new guise, the crime assumes the
destabilising dimension of an “act of war”: the original penalty, as an
indirect extrinsication of the instinct to preserve society, must have a
social nature right from the start - that is, it must present itself as a
reaction by society to actions which are directly harmful to it. As the
so-called bellum omnium against omnes has only existed in the unhisto-
rical speculation of the past, likewise has private vengeance with no
social element never existed. It is necessary, therefore, to intervene
in order to preserve order and to make sure that the cultural instances
of “defence of society” arise from the objective need to defend the
the harm caused and the punishment inflicted. The choices regarding punitive symmetry
do not only concern the repressive aspect, but sometimes also preventive punitive action,
as in the case of the passage in St Mark’s Gospel (.-) which states that: “if thy hand
offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands
to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: Where their worm dieth not,
and the fire is not quenched. And if thy if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee
to enter halt into life, than having two feet to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall
be quenched: Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thine eye
offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one
eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire: Where their worm dieth not, and the
fire is not quenched” (from King James Bible).
. According to F. Resta, one can “identify a dual track, enemy/citizen, that reproduces
and transforms, reiterates and withdraws at the same time, the political code of the
friend/enemy” (’Nemici e criminali. Le logiche del controllo’, L’Indice penale, I, ,
-, ). M. D observes that, “according to this binary logic, there are no nuances
between enemy and friend, or between the citizen and the enemy; they are categories
incapable of communicating, with irreconcilable logic: one of dialogue and the other of
war; one respecting all the fundamental and political rights, the other not. The criminal law
of the enemy, thus, should be limited to the phenomena where, in reality, the perpetrator
of the crime is only considered as an enemy to be fought: so, to exclude this label every
time, it is not possible to say (or admit) that the State operates with the mere purpose of
neutralisation, combat or annihilation” (’Il diritto penale di fronte al “nemico”’, Cass. pen.,
 (), -, ).
. In practice, reaction by a state legal order is precisely the “purpose” that criminal
law pursues, in part affirming itself as an instrument regulating the relationships between
members, but above all as that part of law that studies the prohibited act and the most
suitable form of punishment. The aim and purpose of punishment have been ably clarified
by F.  L. As Liszt points out, a focused reaction by society is influenced in fact by
the clear vision of the meaning that the crime has for the existing groups of individuals -
the family, tribal society, the State (Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht, Berlin: J. Guttenberg,
).
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general public from unjustifiable aggression. The contractualistic
elements that link the citizen to the State also dictate, in an essentially
preventative way, the need to defend oneself: according to Rousseau,
the death penalty inflicted on criminals may be considered in more or
less the same way: in order not to become the victim of a murderer,
we accept that we can die if we become one. In the social contract,
he adds, far from disposing of one’s own life, we think solely of gua-
ranteeing it and it cannot be presumed that any of the participants is
already thinking of “being hanged”.
The death penalty certainly belongs to that broad range of actions
where the extreme cruelty of the crime committed, the death of an
innocent citizen, merits the death of the killer as its punishment in
the name of a rigid canon of compensatory justice produced by a state
of need that cannot be addressed otherwise.
Nevertheless, this point of view is quickly rejected in favour of an
economically feasible solution. In fact, pecuniary penalties represen-
ting the means to extinguish obligations due for killing a man were
replaced by corporal punishment to be carried out in public, certainly
of greater value as an example but at the same time able to guarantee
a satisfactory discharge of the obligation. In economic terms, history
. G. Rusche - O. Kircheimer, Punishment and Social Structure (New York: Russel
& Russel, ); M. A, La défense sociale nouvelle (Cujas: Paris, ). In Italy, cf. P.
N, ‘Il principio di legalità e il principio di difesa sociale’, Scuola positiva (),
-; A. B, ‘Criminologia liberale e ideologia della difesa sociale’, La Questione
criminale,  (), .
. J. J. R, Du contrat social, ou principes du droit politique (), ed. J. M. Fataud
and M. C. Bartholy (Paris: Bibliothèque Bordas, ), bk II.
. L. F, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale (Rome-Bari: Laterza, ,
p. ff.), where the original penalty is not defined by a chronological date, but by the form
and cases and the ways in which it is applied. Cf. also G. T, Visibilmente crudeli.
Malviventi, persone sospette e gente qualunque dal Medioevo all’età moderna (Bologna: Il Mulino,
, p. ff.); A. Z, ‘La pena di morte in Italia nel Tardo Medioevo’, Clio & Crimen, 
(), p. .
. D. T: “The principle of retribution therefore carries out the function, in
Kantian criminal doctrine, of determining whom to punish and when, while a specific
principle of retribution, jus talionis, establishes the quality and quantity of penalties” (’Kant
e il diritto di punire’, Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, Milan:
Giuffrè, , p. ); therefore, “the talion principle [. . . ] establishes the degree of the
penalty, but cannot, according to Kant, constitute its justification: lying to someone who
has lied to us, for example, treating him as he has treated us, is intrinsically wrong, and the
retributive nature of such an action cannot make it less wrong” (’Kant e il diritto di punire’,
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has left various conversion tables for the injured parts of the body
to be compensated for by paying out sums of money, whose degree
represented the consideration corresponding to the gravity of the
offence. In mediaeval Germany, the Wiedergeld was a compensatory
mechanism that imposed “the indemnity that the offender had to
pay the injured party or his family to prevent feuding; repairing the
damage, and also including a share due to the sovereign for the breach
of the peace (also known as Wehr-geld, war money)”. But equally
interesting is the system of compensation set up by the English King
Aethelbert who reigned over Kent from  to , with the adoption
of ninety different laws making it possible to establish the sum in
shillings that the offender had to pay the injured party or his family if
he had caused him some injury, ranging from a bruise ( shillings) to
breaking a bone ( shillings).
The exercise of the right of a State to punish originates from a
sense of justice meant to guarantee a double-purpose intervention: to
punish the person responsible and to stop those close to the injured
party taking vengeance. It is also true that in modern law, State justice
is practised only as a form of implementation of positive law, whose
criteria of stability and the predetermination of the prescriptive law
to be observed guarantee uniform application of the regulations and
ensure equal treatment of all those who commit the same wrong
action. But at the same time the application of the death penalty
must be the reasoned and guaranteed result of an investigation into
the prohibited act and the responsibility of the one who committed
it, otherwise it would only create worry, and that sense of justice
called upon to prevent acts of vengeance would be crushed under
resentment against a State which does not intervene to respect justice,
p. ).
. Apposite and rich references to the theme may be found in S. A, Diritto penale.
Parte generale (Padua: Cedam, ), p. ff.
. For more details, cf. Miller, Eye for an Eye. On close examination, modern civil law
also makes use of a similar compensation table when it is necessary to assess compensation
for damage in the case of material damage to the person. Also in this case the retributive
canon is called upon to solve questions regarding amounts between different material
entities, because also in modern law, as in the past, this is the only way to compensate for a
tort.
. F.  L, Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht.
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in the ideal sense, or positive law.
The death penalty, furthermore, has a highly symbolic value, in
the same way that the symbols of justice and the force of law evoke
the strong image of the established order of the relationships between
members of society and, with them, the best guarantee of maintaining
the compactness of an organised community. From the emotional
and personal angle, feelings towards the death penalty rightly draw
on the anthropological aspect of the issue and deeply affect the per-
sonal and collective life of the human community. Biagio Petrocelli
observed that
the exaggerations and degeneration of the impulse to vengeance
and the reaction that rightly developed against them with the develo-
pment of civilisation have meant that little by little, in our conscience,
a unilateral and limited view of vengeance has become more deeply
rooted, restricting the meaning almost exclusively to exaggerated and
uncontrolled acts, and leaving in the shadows its deep and primitive
core and with it the human need which is in no way inferior.
. The weak point of legislation allowing capital punishment such as that of many
of the United States of America, consists in the adversarial criminal procedure for crimes
punishable by death. This will be discussed later, even if it may be appropriate to refer now
to a document produced in  by renowned US jurists, who, after careful assessment of
laws and competence, affirm the substantial failure of the punitive system envisaging the
death penalty. See the Report of the Council to the Membership of the American Law Institute on
the Matter of the Death Penalty ( April ), in www.ali.org.
. M. S, ‘La benda della giustizia. Iconografia, diritto e leggi penali dal Me-
dioevo all’Età moderna’, in Ordo juris. Storia e forme dell’esperienza giuridica (Milan: Giuffrè,
, p. ); A. P, Giustizia bendata. Percorsi storici di un’immagine (Turin: Einaudi,
). The blindfold of Justice and ‘blindness’ in judging - or impartiality between the
parties - is the best iconographic representation of human justice, which aims to apply the
law using the mighty sword, which will fall upon one of those taking part in the trial.
. B. P, ‘La funzione della pena’, in Saggi di diritto penale (Padua: Cedam,
), p. . Cf. also P. D’E, La pena di morte e la sua abolizione dichiarata teoricamente
e storicamente secondo la filosofia hegeliana (Pavia: Hoepli, ). After a decided personal
change of heart on this difficult issue, G. C, Una lezione accademica sulla pena di
morte detta nell’Università di Pisa il  marzo  (Pisa: Tip. Nistri, ).
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.. The damnatio of the cultural transversality of the question of
capital punishment
And yet the sinister fascination aroused by the death penalty is the
true reason why it is impossible to situate in a methodologically
appreciable way all the elements which establish the need for it and
all the reasons for not using it.
With the passing of the centuries, more and more justifications
have been added. Thus, reducing the different circumstances to a
question of rationality always leads to addressing the vast conceptual
corollaries of the subject in an excessively analytical, and perhaps
unhelpfully overabundant, way. This naturally ongoing process has
led to the issue of capital punishment as a punishment being discussed
across the board. All disciplines have amply taken up and investigated
the utility of resorting to the death penalty as a possible form of
punishment. The strong emotional connotation that accompanies
the ‘expiry’ of the convict’s existence has found fertile terrain in
narrative literature addressing the question of the death penalty. It
is no surprise then that in the criminal law of all eras, there have
been many arguments in favour of abolitionism, thus leading to the
proliferation of arguments against the death penalty.
. It is difficult not to agree with Bobbio when, in the first footnote of his ‘Il dibattito
attuale sulla pena di morte’, he states that “The literature on the death penalty is vast, but
repetitive” (N. Bobbio, L’età dei diritti (Turin: Einaudi, ), p. . Cf. also A. Danese, Non
uccidere Caino. Scenari e problemi della pena di morte, con scritti vari (Milan: Ed. Paoline, ).
On the justifications debated during the drafting of Alfredo Rocco’s Penal Code, where
restoration of the penalty was considered necessary, cf. A. Casalinuovo, Il problema della
pena di morte, with a preface by E. Carnevale (Catanzaro: Brusia, ), p. ff. Some years
before, there had been another attempt to show the complete view of the arguments for
and against the death penalty in a systematic and exhaustive way in the work by P. R,
La pena di morte e la sua critica (Genoa: Libreria Mario Bozzi, ). See also O. V,
Bibliografia italiana della pena di morte (Catania: Preminto, ).
. On the scenario where philosophical and legal issues have overlapped, leading to a
literary treatment of the subject of justice, punishment and death, cf. F. O, Reconter la loi.
Aux sorces de l’imaginaire juridique (Paris: Jacob, ); F. Amarelli and F. Lucrezi (eds), Il
processo contro Gesù (Naples: Jovene, ).
. Key examples are V. Hugo, Le dernier jour d’un condamné (; Paris: E. Michaud,
); A. Camus, Réflexions sur la guillotine, ed. by Calmann-Lévy (Paris: Gallimard, ); C.
Duff, A Handbook on Hanging (New York, NY: The New York Review of Books, ); L.
Sciascia, Porte aperte (Milan: Adelphi, ).
. P. E, Della pena capitale, p. ff; P. E, ‘Programma’, Giornale per l’abolizione
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In public opinion, in fact, the issue of death is treated as one of
the possible forms which criminal sanctions may take, being often in-
fluenced by cultural aspects which derive from considerations beyond
the legal sphere. The culturally transversal nature of the subject also
determines conceptual transversality, so the contamination of disci-
plinary areas distracts from the centrality of the legal nature of the
institutionalisation of death as a punishment.
These are fundamentally the reasons why the abuse of the question
in other disciplines has greatly undermined the essence of its legal
basis, turning the categorical imperative of retributive justice into
“thou shalt not kill”, without however explaining why it is not right -
or fair - to resort to death as an extreme form of punishment. The
method ascertaining the legitimacy and validity of a choice today
strongly feels the effect of non-legal elements, each of which has a
basis in dialectic, but none of which can justify a choice in favour of
abolitionism able to show once and for all the unsuitability of such a
measure as part of the normative fabric of a modern State.
The gap between justice and law has decidedly widened and - in
line with the complex nature of the issue - so have the interpretations,
especially between logics based on an ethical/moral approach, or
natural law and grounds which, on the contrary, are the fruit of a
markedly pragmatic spirit.
The truth is that in the field of criminal law there is no theoretical
elaboration convincingly pinpointing the grounds for justifying the
death penalty in a coherent legal system, other than the first and sterile
observations that arose in a social context which is not yet fully struc-
della pena di morte  (), -; I. M, La morte come pena. Saggio sulla violenza legale
(Rome: Donzelli (), ); G. M, ‘La pena di morte’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.
(), p. .
. M. J. De Larra, “once the convict has been informed of [. . . ] the sentence and last
vengeance that the whole of society exercises over him in an unequal fight, the wretch
is led to the chapel, where religion takes possession of him as a now certain prey; divine
justice is there waiting to receive him from the hands of earthly justice” (’Los barateros , o
el desafio y la pena de muerte’, in El Espanol. Diario de las doctrinas y de los intereses sociales,
n. ,  April ).
. Interesting observations on the international legislative premises on the abolitionist
side are provided by S. Annibale, ‘La pena di morte nei rapporti internazionali posti in
essere dagli Stati’, Riv. pen.,  (), -.
. On the close relationships between positive law and justice, see G. Z,’
Introduzione’, in R. Alexy, Concetto e validità del diritto (Turin: Einaudi, ), p. VIII.
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tured in its complexity or organised on a legislative basis. On closer
examination, ultimately, the reasons proposed are all characterised by
needs actually dictated by contingent circumstances or as the result of
legitimate but unmotivated emotional reactions. It is no exaggeration
to state that society’s needs for laws justifying capital punishment are
not uniform and that they are in any case insufficient to justify the
punitive basis of the death penalty.
In reality, the justification currently given for abolitionism in a
number of countries is represented by one specific legislative limit
imposed by criminal justice legislation: the fact of not considering it
one of the possible punishments, regardless of all the possible grounds
leading the legislator to accept it as an option. It is also necessary
to recognise that in the end the only true limit to the admissibility of
the death penalty is positive law, legal prescription and not the ‘supreme
value’ of justice, in whose name, on the other hand, death would
continue its punitive course solely because of its apparent utility: “In
a scenario as serious and concrete as that of punishment, trying to
work out a ‘theory’ may perhaps seem useless. What need is there,
in fact, to formulate a theory when the meaning of punishment is
evident, and when criminal systems must face above all problems
of a practical nature? Why resort to interpretation when anyone can
recognise the aim of the punishment and its contingent defects?”
This is presumably why art.  of the Italian Constitution has been
a safeguard against past and future solicitations in the form of the
necessary defence from a threat to security in the face of new and
. For a description of the way the death penalty has been excluded from legislation,
see G. S, ‘Il cammino verso l’abolizione della pena di morte’, L’indice penale (),
p. .
. This concept represents the essence of all the American literature on the theory
of punitive systems. Quite unlike J. Waldron, ‘Lex talionis’, Arizona Law Review (), p.
, who insists on the need to recognise a theoretical basis to justify “punitive justice”,
W. I. M sustains that although this may be true for punitive systems disciplined by
the rule of law, he does not understand the reason why those who desire that a wrong
be punished must build and justify a complete theory of the punishability of acts. He
also adds that - given the way most human societies have organised themselves in order
to establish norms of co-existence - it should be those who are against it who should
provide greater explanation (Eye for an Eye). Obviously, the same standpoint colours the
view of American jurists, who express similar scepticism on the superfluity of a theoretical
conception of punishment (cf. D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social
Theory, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ).
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modern forms of hostile acts. However, experience shows that what
power aims to achieve with the death penalty is security, even though
it does not really manage to do so, but rather finds something else it
was not looking for.
On the other hand, it is necessary to recognise that a legal prohibi-
tion of constitutional rank coexists with rules belonging to ordinary
legislation which treats life like any other human right, to the point
that it can come into conflict with other constitutional rights albeit
with a different value. The concept of the inalienable right to life
cannot but take into consideration the fact that there are criminal
circumstances such as the “state of need” envisaged under art.  of
the penal code, which holds the life of a third party as bound to come
out worse in a comparative assessment, and even a superficial reading
seems to attribute disposable character to life. The same may be said
for justifications in the name of “legitimate defence” in art.  of the
penal code. Nevertheless, we must point out that in these cases life
is placed at the centre of a utilitarian dynamic only because the other
element of comparison is the life of another person. But this does not
imply the existence of the unmotivated disposability of such an im-
portant good for the legal system or that it leads to the comparison of
unequal goods; or that it comes out worse in comparison with goods
of a lower rank, which by their nature are fully disposable. Quite
the opposite, it has been confirmed that the existence of the above-
mentioned crime of ‘homicide of the consenting party’, situated in
the same area of reasoning, places a solid and insurmountable barrier
to the disposability of the good of life, excluding the faculty to dispose
of it also by the one who requested to be killed. This strengthens the
concept that even the hypothesis of its justification safeguards life in
the same way as the law that prohibits murder directly imposes its
protection.
In reality, in the Italian legislative tradition, the Constitution has
given a particular normative level to the protection of life also in the
punishments set out in the criminal code. The choice expressed in
. G. F, Art. , III comma Cost., in Commentario della Costituzione (Bologna:
Zanichelli, ), p. ; F. S, ‘La necessità di un omicidio: l’ordinamento italiano
verso l’abolizione totale della pena di morte’, Critica del diritto, - (), -.
. F. G, Des conspirations et de la justice politique.
. R. C, ‘La pena di morte in Italia: una rassegna storica’, Critica del diritto, -
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the  Zanardelli Code eliminated capital punishment according
to criteria guided by indulgent political choices after the emergency
regulations set up in the wake of the Unification of Italy. With the
Republican Constitution, however, Parliament lost for ever the power
to reintroduce the death penalty through ordinary legislation, as this
option belongs to the constitutional basis of the Republic, making up
part of the constitutional pact.
Article , with its lapidary fourth paragraph “The death penalty
is not allowed” has, in the past, also provided an efficacious barrier
to the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the capital punishment
in other legal orders connected with our legislative system through
extradition. Since this fundamental decision was taken, the Italian Con-
stitutional Court has always denied the extradition of foreigners who
had committed crimes punishable by death in their home countries.
(), -.
. The discussion followed the lines of the various penal codes used in the pre-
unification States, some of which allowed, while others had abolished, capital punishment.
On this, cf. G. P, Sulla pena di morte () (Lecce: del Grifo, ).
. P. S. M, Primo congresso giuridico italiano in Roma. Relazione sulla tesi I. Abolizio-
ne della pena di morte e proposta di una scala penale (Rome: Tipografia Fratelli Pallotta, ), p.
VIII. This was the emergency legislation still in force in the southern provinces for around
three years, which envisaged the death penalty inflicted by Special Military Courts. The
first Congress voted unanimously for the following resolution: “The Congress of Italian
Jurists expresses the wish that the abolition of the death penalty, which for many years has
been in place in a part of Italy, be extended to the whole of Italy; and that the new Italian
Criminal Code effectively guarantee order and safety in society without recourse to blood
punishments for crimes punished therein. It orders the Commission to make this desire
known in the form of a petition to the Parliament at a time it shall consider appropriate; at
the same time continuing its Studies on the Criminal Code to be referred to the future
Congress”. The political factor weighs once again in a particularly significant way in M.
Sbriccoli: “The unification of criminal law, after the failure of the first attempts in part due
to the post-unification emergency, did not seem imminent. It was delayed, furthermore, by
some unresolved issues (first and foremost that of whether to maintain the death penalty or
not) which showed once again [. . . ] how the choices concerning criminal law were tied up
with political ones and concerned sensitive questions on the relationship between power
and society” (’La penalistica civile. Teorie e ideologie del diritto penale nell’Italia unita’
(), now in Storia del diritto penale e della giustizia, Milan: Giuffrè, , t. I, p. ).
. Corte Cost. (Constitutional Court),’ Sent. n.  of  June ’, Riv. it. dir e proc .
pen.,  (), -, with a note by Guido Salvini: “The Royal Decree of  June , nr.
, relating to the extradition between Italy and France of criminals is constitutionally
illegitimate, in the part where it makes extradition possible for crimes punishable by death
in the legal systems of the applicant State, due to violation of Arts. , paragraphs I and ,
paragraph IV. Cost.” A case which has recently been the subject of legal and scientific debate
. A necessary observation on methodology 
In this way, positive law has affirmed a principle of constitutional
legality hierarchically higher and more significant than that of ordina-
ry legality sanctioned by article  of the Italian Penal Code that was
traditionally called upon to regulate the application of the law in a
liberal age. This is a source of law high enough to link the canvas of
fundamental constitutional values inextricably to the value of life itself,
which passes implicitly through the prohibition of the use of death as a
punishment, and which cannot but be considered a supraconstitutional
principle. To add further prescriptive force to the prohibition of the
death penalty, the Constitution has invoked the principle of “human
dignity” which animates all constitutional paradigms referring to re-
spect for the person, in its different social and personal manifestations
(like for example in the case of enforcement of the sentence).
is one involving an Italian citizen, Pietro Venezia, charged with murder in Florida and
sheltering in this country. It all stems from Corte Cost. (Constitutional Court)„ ‘Sentence
nr  of  June ’, in www.cortecostituzionale.it. Cf. also V. Del Tufo, Estradizione e
reato politico (Naples: Jovene, ); M. Pisani, ‘Pena di morte ed estradizione nel Trattato
Italia-USA: il caso Venezia’, Indice pen.,  (), -; F. Schiaffo, ‘Una sentenza storica in
materia di estradizione e pena di morte’, Riv .it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), p. -.
. In article  of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany of  May ,
the first paragraph affirms solemnly and explicitly that “Human dignity shall be inviolable.
To respect and protect it shall be the duty of every State authority”. The same German
doctrine underlines that “dignity” must be considered a principle value above other rights
of constitutional rank, precisely because of the “untouchable nature” of dignity, even more
significant than the concept of inviolability, a superior value in itself. In this way, any
attempt to reintroduce the death penalty into the German penal system will come into
evident conflict with the concept of human dignity. On this, see C. A, La dignità
dell’uomo nella Costituzione di Bonn e nella Costituzione italiana (Milan: Giuffrè, ).

Chapter II
The turning point represented
by the concept of the dignity
of the person
From the state of “reification”
to the concept of “personification” of the “servus poenae”
The expression “servus poenae” was used in the ancient sources of
law to mean a person tainted with crime who bore a debt towards the
system of justice of his social community. The debt was an obligation
which could only be extinguished through the concrete enforcement
of the sentence inflicted by the judge: “for this very reason, the need
to react against wrongdoing, in the end, being one of the fundamental
needs of human life, is one the areas of needs which social organi-
sation, even in its earliest stages, tended to assume and control for
itself ”.
In reality, the subjective title of “servus” indicated a precise category
of relationships between the owner of rights over the subject and the
slave, who was considered neither more nor less than a thing or a
good. A marked change of cultural perspective came about when
persons became endowed with “human dignity”. The concept of
. G. G. H, “The servus poenae. The lex Porcia established that Roman citizens
could not be beaten with rods, nor undergo the death penalty to which they had been
condemned [. . . ]. On account of this eminent prerogative of Roman citizens arose the
fiction whereby those condemned to death became slaves” (Lo studio del diritto romano
ovvero le Instituta e le Pandette, ed. by N. Comerci, Naples: Stabilimento letterario tipografico
dell’Ateneo, ,  vols, vol. I, p. ).
. B. P, ‘La funzione della pena’, p. .
. F. B, La dignità umana come concetto e come valore costituzionale (Turin:
Giappichelli, ); L. F, Principia juris. Teoria del diritto e della democrazia. . Teoria
del diritto, p. . On the constitutional concept of the ‘dignity’ of the human person,
the German Constitutional Court repeatedly returned to this subject, focusing on the

 The right of a state to punish by death
dignity represents the intrinsic limit to the consideration of man
as a thing and at the same time the selection criterion to prevent
human persons from undergoing measures adversely affecting their
dignity. Also a State exercising the right to inflict a punishment that
limits freedom must reckon with more suitable ways to stop punitive
measures injuring the inviolability of the moral heritage of man in
terms of his absolute value. It is no mere chance that the slave enjoyed
no rights nor possessed goods, so his only value was represented
by his body, and it was precisely over the body that disputes arose
which made it possible to consider that value a possible object of the
transaction of goods. In reality, the affirmation of absolute value that
the human person takes on serves to undermine the relationship with
the State which sees him solely as an element subordinated to the
arbitrary choices of the system.
According to Francesco Carrara, the principle of “conservation”,
thanks to which “the power to kill” is denied, becomes limited when
death becomes necessary to prevent others from being killed. For this
reason “when the real need to defend other people does not require
such a sacrifice”, the principle of natural “conservation” comes back
to the fore and the death of a man cannot be permissible. What
fact that dignity is a conceptual container for the profile of the person from different
perspectives, such as from the right to health to the rights of prisoners in prison. Of
particular importance among the latest rulings see Constitutional Court, ‘Sent. Nr  of 
July ’, in http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/. For the concept of the dignity of the
person in relation to punishment, see M. A. C, Pena, diritto e dignità umana. Saggio
sulla filosofia del diritto penale (Turin: Giappichelli, ).
. For the concept of ‘human dignity’ which began to take root in the eighteenth
century, in relation to the notion of equality, from which it already appeared clearly distinct,
see R. S, The Fall of Public Man (New York: Knopf, ). For further perspectives
on this complex question, cf. also R. Sennet and J. Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New
York: Knopf, ), p. ff.
. It was no coincidence that slaves lost their lives for crimes that cost a free man 
‘soldi’ (e. g. a small amount of money), as mentioned in P. Del Giudice, La vendetta nel
diritto longobardo (Hoepli: Milan, ).
. F. C, Programma del corso di diritto criminale (Lucca: Tip. Giusti, ), p. .
Giuseppe Bettiol’s criticism of this hypothesis is well known: “Carrara himself - while
being a liberal - when he wants to show the illegitimacy of the death penalty does not
appeal to the political principles of liberalism, but resorts to the strange hypothesis of the
conservative character of the laws of nature which shows the effect of the scientific climate
the great jurists worked in” (G. B, ‘Sulle massime pene: morte ed ergastolo’, Riv. it.
dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -; now in Scritti giuridici, Padua: Cedam, vol. II, , p. ).
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the criterion to verify the relationship between defence and sacrifice
is remains in the shadow of an affirmation of great symbolic value.
What is important, however, is to have ascertained that at the root of
the infliction of this punishment there is an inescapable relationship
between a punishable act and its punishment. Only in this way is the
criterion of proportion between the gravity of the wrong and the
punishment respected, together with the requirement of uniformity
between the elements that lead to the sentence.
The sentence must be passed in relation to the offence commit-
ted and not the person. From this derives the confirmation that the
“servus poenae” is a person and not a “good” or “res” and, thus, the
apportionment of the punishment must be related to the “person’s”
assets (his/her freedom and the possibility to act freely), the rights
he/she enjoys, in terms of correspondence between goods of the sa-
me nature, and not the elements constituting the person, i. e. his/her
body and life. Basically, the cardinal concept of “defence of society”
is the idea that tends to consider the person as a means and not an
end: “The person has value only insofar as he is part of the system
and is of value only to the system. From this point of view the idea
of the defence of society leads to the negation of the concept of the
‘person’ as a synonym of ‘responsible individuality’, insofar as he is
‘free’”. However, there can be real danger from the point of view of
the defence of society, i. e., the incapacitation of probable criminals
due to such a strong need to prevent crime as to affect a person who
is only potentially dangerous and not one who is held responsible for
disrupting social co-existence: “a person is eliminated by virtue of the
danger he poses, not the things that he has done, but the things he
can do in future”.
Immanuel Kant had already warned from considering the person
merely as a means or a thing to be used to serve a purpose, which,
Cf. also D. Pulitanò, ‘Ergastolo e pena di morte: le massime pene tra referendum e riforma’,
Democrazia e diritto, - (), -.
. On the sacredness of life and the impossibility of sacrificing it, see G. Agamben,
Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita (Turin: Einaudi, ), especially p. ff.
. G. B, ‘Sulle massime pene: morte ed ergastolo’, p. .
. M. S, ‘La piccola criminalità e la criminalità dei poveri nelle riforme sette-
centesche del diritto e della legislazione penale’ (), now in Storia del diritto penale e della
giustizia (Milan: Giuffrè, ) vol. I, p. .
 The right of a state to punish by death
albeit apparently useful for society, led to the exploitation of the indivi-
dual. In fact, he observed that man, and in general every rational being,
exists as an end in all his actions (whether they concern himself or
other rational beings), not merely as a means to be used arbitrarily by
this or that will - for all these reasons, he argued, man should always
be regarded as an end in himself.
In this sense, the theory of punishment is enriched by a further
value profile, as it does not represent only the legal limit of the pu-
nitive intervention of the State, but also constitutes the limit to such
a punitive act. The ability to punish thus bears in itself the limit of the
degree of possible action, so that the act committed is punished and
not the person who committed it as an example to society, with a
punishment so severe and exemplary as to dissuade all other potential
offenders.
Only preventive theories of punishment can really consolidate
the concept that punishment is addressed to the person for the act
committed, corresponding perfectly to its gravity, with the purpose of
dissuading the person responsible and discouraging the same conduct
in others.
. I. K, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (), ed. by P. Menzer (text by
the “Akademie Ausgabe”, Berlin: Hrgb. Vonder Koniglich Preubischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, vol. IV, ). The concept of human dignity as a central element in
Kantian thought is outlined in M. A. Cattaneo, Dignità umana e pena nella filosofia di Kant
(Milan: Giuffrè, ).
. For the implications of the right to punish and the basis of the punitive precept, see
M. J. Falcon Y Tella and F. Falcon Y Tella, Fundamento y finalidad de la sancion. Un derecho a
castigar? (Madrid: Marcial Pons, Ediciones Juridicas y Sociales, ).
. The concept of the individualisation of punishment is expressed in the Italian
Constitution, with a strong emphasis on special prevention, as an instance of considering
personal punishment alongside dissuasion with regard to potential future behaviour. Cf.
M. A. Cattaneo, ‘La dottrina penale di Karl Grolman nella filosofia giuridica del criticismo’,
in G. Tarello (ed.), Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica; S. Moccia, Il diritto penale
tra essere e valore. Funzione della pena e sistematica teleologica (Naples: ESI, ). See also G.
Delitala: “this means that the threat must normally be countered by the application of the
sentence, but that it is also perfectly possible to waiver the punishment in the case of those
subjects for whom, in the light of experience, it would be useless or still worse, harmful,
and as long as - naturally - the waiver for such categories of subject does not frustrate the
ultimate aim of general prevention. Within these limits we have to be prepared to willingly
acknowledge the need for special prevention” (’Prevenzione e repressione nella riforma
penale’, Riv. it. di dir. pen., , , -, ). This assertion regarding the decision not
to punish clarifies that with the individualisation of the punishment from the point of view
of re-education it is possible also not to apply it, when the hoped for result may also be
. The turning point represented by the concept of the dignity of the person 
The two perspectives, then, take as their starting point the diffe-
rent roles played by the so-called ‘primary criminalisation’, i. e. that
expressed in the comminatory phase of the threat of punishment.
However, in reality the main difference emerges clearly in the phase
when the sentence is served, i. e. in the so-called ‘secondary crimi-
nalisation’, where the punishment is carried out according to utterly
disproportionate indices of severity.
If, then, the relationship in question is between the set of rights
that a person has and the punishment, as a form of chastisement for
the act committed, it will be possible to confirm the concreteness of
this relationship only if the life of the person is safeguarded. The
eruption on the scene of a utilitarian purpose of punishment, set
within a broader concept of social utilitarianism, knits well with the
diversified choices of prevention. Attention shifts onto the good or
the right that man possesses by nature, i. e., personal freedom with all
its various corollaries. This is the reason why the modern version of
the social contract between men focuses on safeguarding the life of the
person, an indispensible condition if he is to serve the sentence for the
crime committed, unlike Rousseau’s original version whereby: “since
he has recognised himself as such (no longer a member of the State),
at least as regards residing there, he must be excluded from it either by
exile, as a contravener of the pact, or by death, as a public enemy; such
an enemy is not in fact a moral person, but a man, and so it is a right
of war to kill the vanquished”. Outside this model, the ancient, but
reached in this way. It is not a question of the improper use of the power of clemency,
but of implementing the punishment in such a way as to re-educate rather than to inflict
unjustifiable suffering, perhaps exemplary for society but of no use to the offender. For
an overview of prevention in modern terms, see M. Pavarini, ‘Lo scopo della pena’, in G.
Insolera, N. Mazzacuva, M. Pavarini and M. Zanotti (eds), Introduzione al sistema penale
(Turin: Giappichelli, ), vol. I p. ff.
. These notions are analysed in detail by M. Sbriccoli, ‘Giustizia criminale’, p. .
. M. D, ‘La condanna a morte di Saddam Hussein. Riflessioni sul divieto di
pena capitale e sulla “necessaria sproporzione” della pena nelle gross violations’, Cass. pen., 
(), .
. M. R, ‘Utilitarismo e pena capitale. Il tema della pensa di morte in Jeremy
Bentham e John Stuart Mill’, Annali della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza di Genova, - (-),
ff.
. J. J. R, Du contrat social, bk II. As we shall see later on, the idea of the
delinquent as an enemy to declare war on would contaminate all the theories of the death
penalty especially from the American perspective.
 The right of a state to punish by death
never surpassed, category of the “servus poenae” loses its social role as
a component of the community and becomes a potential destroyer of
the ordered way of life in society. The relationship between the crime
and its punishment will thus be founded on maintaining the system
as it is on the one hand, and the person, able to express his potential
destructive force or rather his existence, on the other. There can be
no departure from this axiological order enshrined under the form of
imperative in cases of need: to eliminate adversaries and everything
that threatens ordered co-existence. Punishment becomes a term in a
new equation with the life of the enemy: “The death of a citizen can
only be thought necessary for two reasons. First, even when deprived
of freedom he still has such relationships and power as to threaten
the security of the nation. And then, when his existence may lead to
a revolution able to threaten the form of established government”.
And his living presence, also in limited or segregated form, could
continue to express a level of anger able to compromise the basis of
an organised community. Yet extinguishing an existence would not
be a legal sanction, but a natural need to find a suitable defence of the
solidity and integrity of the social order.
. C. B, Dei delitti e delle pene (), with a Preface by S. Rodotà (Milan:
Feltrinelli, ), p. . See also I. M, La pena di morte a Milano nel secolo di Beccaria
(Vicenza: Neri Pozza, ); M. R. Weisser, Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Europe
(Hassocks: The Harvester Press, ). On this point it may be useful to come back to
M. Donini, ‘La condanna a morte di Saddam Hussein’, and underline the indignation
caused by the death sentence of Nicola Ceausescu and his wife in December of ,
as recalled by Antonio Cassese on  December  in ‘L’uccisione del tiranno’ (http:
//www.lettera.it/): “but when it is a question of a dethroned King in the heart of a
revolution which is far from being consolidated by law, of a King whose mere name attracts
the scourge of war on a nation in turmoil, neither prison nor exile can make his existence
a matter of indifference to public happiness”. See also the French motto “Louis must die,
because the homeland must live”, which represents for Robespierre the only possible
departure from the prohibition of resorting to the death penalty: “As for me, I abhor the
death penalty brought into being by your laws and I have neither love nor hate for Louis: I
hate only his crimes. I have asked for the abolition of the death penalty before the assembly
that you still call ‘constituent’ and it is not my fault if the first principles of reason seemed to
them like moral and political heresy”, in M. Robespierre, Speech to the National Convention
of  December (now published in Tre discorsi politici, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, ,
pp.  and ).
. On this, see also the position held by I. Kant, who (in Die Metaphysik der Sitten, )
argued that even if civil society broke down with the consent of all its members, the last
murderer left in prison should be executed, so that each one would bear the penalty for his
conduct.
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In this way, any attempt to transform a thing into a person will
flounder against the need to protect the system and thus takes up the
alternating idea of the term of correlation of the punishment, always
in the light of a reason or a purpose which can impose its restoration.
The concept of “reification” of the human being has also under-
taken a singular journey in juridical terms, having by now become
a distant memory where the death penalty had a markedly public
law connotation whose fundamental criterion was the assimilation
of capital punishment into the institution of expropriation for public
utility. The definition of a person as “servus poenae” was confirmed
in his social and legal subordination since he belonged to the category
of things expropriated for public use, where the good or the “thing”
was himself. From a cultural point of view, a concept such as that set
out by Francesco Carnelutti is the product of a time where the central
position that the State took on in the legal order of the liberal political
system gave little importance to the concept of individual and social
dignity as constituent characteristics of the human person, which only
with the passing of time and a new era for human rights would make
an exclusive point of reference in legal systems.
A ready and convincing answer to this eccentric hypothesis may be
found in De Marsico (he himself sentenced to death by the “Special
Extraordinary Court” at the Verona trial which ended on  January
). He rightly sustains that the legal framework of the question
requires the rejection of any analogy between the death penalty and
execution for public utility. In this case, limiting the enjoyment of a
good calls for the citizen to enter into dialogue with the authorities as
participants in the civitas, but in the case of the death penalty, there
can be no question of a right to be exercised because it is the very
owner of the right who is suppressed.
With the recognition of the human dignity of the person, the basis
of any action against the inviolable values is eliminated, because the
establishment of such a right comes to be part of the constitutional
. F. C, ‘La pena di morte nel diritto pubblico’, Riv. di dir. pubbl., XXIII,
second series, part one (), -.
. The judgment may be read in full in V. Cersosimo, Dall’istruttoria alla fucilazione.
Storia del processo di Verona (Milan: Garzanti, ), p. ff.
. A. De Marsico, ‘Pena di morte ed espropriazione per pubblica utilità’, Giornale
dell’Avvocato ( Sept. , n. ).
 The right of a state to punish by death
pact and is thus non-negotiable, without the irremediable “breakup”
of the Constitution.
Chapter III
Main justifications for capital punishment:
A Summary
The intrinsically political nature of recourse to the death penalty
The first and fundamental reason for resorting to the death penalty is
rooted in the archaic tradition of law as a way of governing human so-
ciety still lacking in order. All the ancient texts, while having a cultural
profile of the ethical-religious type, underline the need for the wrong
inflicted to be remedied through private vengeance. However, also
in the ancient sources, conceptual positions emerge in sharp contrast
with the retributional spirit of punishment, laying the ground for a
new and different approach to punishment. This new approach to
punishment is based on the idea of a man’s future and not his past;
thus, it does not focus on punishing what he has done but rather tries
to prevent him from repeating what he has committed. After all, it is
a question of representing a model of defence adopted by an organi-
sed society in order to forestall or prevent socially harmful conduct.
In Protagoras, Plato is implacable in his denunciation of the fact that
vindictive punishment means relying on vengeance as wild animals
do, while he considers it more appropriate to prevent the repetition
of such behaviour by the same person in future, as well as to create a
deterrent for other members of society, which means capitalising on
the benefits to formulate a precise and studied theoretical model of
behaviour, able to protect the community preventively: as Nuvolone
observes, “the application of the death penalty, on the basis of the
principle of ‘whoever has killed shall be killed’ means no more and
. E. C, Il ritorno della vendetta. Pena di morte: giustizia o assassinio? (Milan:
Rizzoli, ), p. . On the period of the Italian communes, cf. A. Z, La cultura della
vendetta nel conflitto politico in età comunale, in R. Delle Donne and A. Zorzi (eds.), Le storie e
la memoria. In onore di Arnold Esch (Florence: Firenze University Press, ), p. .

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no less than applying the lex talionis and the vendetta, and not truly
defending society, which must to be the purpose of all wise legisla-
tors”. The grounds for such reasoning are connected, obviously, with
contingent needs lying outside cultural and ideological models: “In
the remotest period of post-Mycenaean Greek history, documented in
the Homeric epics, the elementary reasoning which [. . . ] drove tribal
societies to practice the vendetta - e. g., the need, in the event of a
murder, to re-establish the numerical balance that it had altered - was
already a thing of the past.”
The ancient sources of law offer an interesting, and at the same
time, current view of the varied reasoning which leads to resorting to
punishment and then to the death penalty. Aulus Gellius carried out
a study of the ancient texts in his Noctes Atticae where he faithfully
traces the philosophical thought of his contemporaries and the ancient
writers. Gellius highlights three distinct causae poeniendis peccatis
which set out the reasons for, and function of, punishment in Roman
law. The first is to correct and punish, while the second is the need
to restore the honour of the injured party, and the third is to set an
example through the punishment of the offender.
This option shows a clear didactic approach which does not consi-
der the education of the offender, but the growth of other members
of society, using the theoretical model that would later go under the
name of general prevention. It expresses a decisive, dissuasive and
. P. N, ‘La pena di morte’, L’Indice penale,  (), -, .
. Cf. E. C, Il ritorno della vendetta, p. .
. Sulla’s imperial Roman legislation replaced the death penalty by perpetual ba-
nishment from the homeland of Roman citizens, the so-called interdictio aquae et
ignis.
. O. D, ‘La pena tra filosofia e diritto nelle Noctes Atticae di Aulo Gellio’, in
O. Diliberto (ed.), Il problema della pena criminale tra filosofia greca e diritto romano (Naples:
Jovene, ), p. .
. See in particular G. P, ‘L’efficacia generalpreventiva della pena di morte’,
Jus., - (), -. For a more general perspective, see O. Diliberto, ‘La pena tra
filosofia e diritto’, p. . See also the deep observations of S. M, Il diritto penale tra
essere e valore. Funzione della pena e sistematica teleologica (Naples: ESI, ), p. , on the
theoretical perspective advanced by Anselm Feuerbach relating to the general preventive
theory of the punishment. Cf. also A. Pagliaro, ‘Le indagini empiriche sulla prevenzione
generale: una interpretazione dei risultati’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -; V. Militello,
Prevenzione generale e commisurazione della pena (Milan: Giuffrè, ). On the various aspects
legitimising this supposition in relation to a constitutionally orientated Italian model of
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intimidatory power in general:
the strongest reason for believing in general prevention is the well-
known experience that the fear of unpleasant consequences, in the
majority of circumstances in life, provides motivation which increases
with the gravity of the feared consequences. It is almost absurd to
think that this common mechanism must lose its meaning when it is
a question of committing or not committing a prosecutable action.
The meaning of punishment as vengeance may then be considered
the second of the different functions illustrated, where reparation is
equivalent to retribution for the wrong committed - which, from the
point of view of modern punitive logic, may be defined as “retribution
for guilt”. We may not however neglect the fact that the evolutionary
model of the conception of punishment runs through the history of
humanity, both in the Greek and Roman civilizations, and is reiterated
in the Roman period, so “merely exemplary precautionary punish-
ment is proper to archaic societies”, while a “punishment proportional
to the crime committed” would seem to be based on “retribution and
not the intimidation inherent in penal sanctions”.
This different consideration of the offender thus marks the point of
transition from the cultural question to the issue of the punishment
of serious crimes, but is also a clear sign of the failure of a punitive
system that up to that moment had entrusted its mission of justice to
solutions which had guaranteed no effective result in the prevention
of crime.
In reality, the question of the necessity to kill the offender is also
found in the sphere of Christian theology, whose point of equilibrium
is dictated by Saint Thomas Aquinas, who bases his ideas on pu-
nishment on needs of a different nature from those based on absolute
theories of punishment. Aquinas’ aim is to reconcile retributional and
preventive needs, importantly because of their effects which would
punishment, see V. Maiello, Clemenza e sistema penale, p. ff.
. J. A, ‘Almenprevensjon - illusjon eller realitet?’, Nordisck Tidsskrift for
Kriminalvideskab, XXXVIII (), -, ; see also T. M, Kan fengsel forsvarses
(Oslo: Pax, ).
. F. C, ‘Cultura e scienza giuridica nel secondo secolo d. C.: Il senso del
passato’ (), now in Giuristi Adrianei (Naples: Jovene,), p. .
. Catholic doctrine would consider the purpose of punishment in terms of morality
and amendment, cf. C. Roeder, ‘Sul fondamento e sullo scopo della pena in riguardo alla
teoria dell’emenda’, Riv. pen. di dott. legisl. e giurispr. (-), vol. II, p. .
 The right of a state to punish by death
ideally be punitive and dissuasive at the same time, but where man, as
a good of creation, is destined once again to become simply a means
of affirming the power of justice, or rather, the exemplary character
of law.
The Thomistic conception of punishment is an attempt to remove
it from the impasse of the necessity for a State or of an order to
resort to norms focusing on sanctions, and sometimes even the most
extreme, in order, rather, to affirm control over the social order and
eliminate the risk of the subversion of the principles that guide an
organised community. All this, however, is difficult to reconcile with
Christian moral dictates which impose the observance of categorical
imperatives admitting no exception, such as “Thou shalt not kill” or
“Forgive thine enemies”.
A community that consolidates its position as a state and which
imposes a climate of conservation of its order sees in the death penalty
an answer to its “state of institutional necessity”, so that external
attacks do not compromise the political-institutional balance it has
achieved. The state of necessity is a subject that is often invoked to
justify execution, but does not appear consistent with the principle
governing legal apparatus. First of all because, from a strictly cultural
point of view, this kind of justification assumes that there is an offence
to be committed and only by committing it can the action then be
justified. Imagining that a State can be justified in committing an
offence does not make the cause of immunity a valid justification.
Secondly, bringing into play the rules of the cause of justification
is in any case inappropriate, as the necessary condition of defensive
action i. e., a state of real danger and the indispensible urgency of
reaction characterising the act is lacking. Moreover, in affirming the
need for defence, the concept of punishment gradually loses sight
of its reason for being, and moves towards justification of a political
nature, thus departing from the framework of the rule of law. It is at
this point that the gap between the basis and the purpose of the death
. L. E, ‘Appunti critici su un dogma: prevenzione mediante retribuzione’, Riv. it.
dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -.
. A. Bondolfi, Pena e pena di morte (Bologna: Centro Editoriale Dehoniano, );
Antonio Acerbi and Luciano Eusebi (eds), Colpa e pena? La teologia di fronte alla questione
criminale (Milan: Vita e pensiero, ); E. J. Hernandez, Non uccidere. “Il discorso della
montagna” (Naples: Chirico, ).
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penalty widens and, even more so, the disparity between the ultimate
purpose of the death penalty and the purpose of penal sanctions.
The death penalty thus no longer belongs to the range of sanctions
within an organised system of criminal justice, but becomes one of
the instruments used to defend the established order, as do the armed
forces of a given State. In this way, the death penalty becomes a tool at
the service of a different logic, using extreme severity to defend, and
not an ordinary normative means of dissuasion. It is thus a real means
of safeguarding the system, and its intimidatory character is used as a
specific instrument of social control.
This is the conceptual starting point, in my opinion, from which to
provide a modern framework for the death penalty. If, in the traditional
order of the principles of legal sanctions, death was considered one
of the possible means of repression, and fully expressed the essence
or the punitive basis upon which an organised community was based,
today the death penalty is a political act that a State uses to affirm its
own power. The right to punish as a possible and main form of social
control has an intrinsic political meaning, and capital punishment is
the most typical expression of this natural connotation of the law: “The
death penalty itself, far from having any rational or even sentimental
ideology, normally has no basis but political or social necessity”.
There are no more territories to be conquered, but there is, on
the other hand, a need to guarantee stability in a system which has
reached a sufficient degree of structural organisation which cannot to-
lerate crises or threats to co-existence. The death penalty is a warning
message to all who may try to reject the established order. It is in this
notion that the new element within the conceptual framework of the
death penalty emerges. ‘Established order’ does not here refer to the
political-administrative order of a State that invokes sanctions which
traditionally belong to the category of ‘political crimes’ or crimes of
a ‘political nature’. It is safeguarding society that constitutes the new
reference point that in modern democratic systems - unlike totalita-
rian systems - represents the basis for the stability of the social and
political system.
. G. L, La pena di morte e il suo fondamento (Naples: Guida, ), p. .

Chapter IV
Ritualised violence
What is fossilised and what is alive
in the traditional idea of death as a punishment
A detailed examination of the reasoning behind punishment shows
that over the centuries the feeling towards the logic imposing “suffe-
ring” for the offence committed has not changed. The suffering of
the guilty party satisfies the sense of justice and the need to educate
people to observe the law, discouraging conduct harmful to social co-
existence, in accordance with the development of the rules governing
ritualised violence.
It is the blood crime which, among the natural crimes, constitutes
the retributional paradigm of punishment, where symmetry seems
to express the highest degree of correspondence to the offence (in a
logic of lex talionis), while the “artificial crimes” draw the attention of
jurists to a more specific goal of deterrence and prevention towards
society as a whole. The category of artificial crimes is unlike that of
natural crimes because it was constructed by the legislator with the
aim of providing protection under criminal law for acts which arise
as a consequence of life in society and which, unlike blood crimes, in
nature would have no specific and individual protection.
. A. R, Skyld, ansvar og straf (Kobenhavn: Berlingsek, ); G. V, ‘Funzioni
e insufficienze della pena’, Riv. it. dir e proc. pen,  (), -.
. For a careful and systematic investigation of penal legislation under Alfredo Rocco,
see the particularly useful study by A. C, Disciplina giuridica della pena di morte
(Naples: Jovene, ). On the other hand, it should be pointed out that retribution in its
absolute sense, such as that attributed to Hegelian philosophy, not only rejects the idea
of vendetta as a rash punishment, but even opens up to a perspective that goes beyond
retribution in terms of pure aﬄiction, towards an idea of the recovery of the person. On
this theme, see the rich and detailed study by S. Moccia, ‘Contributo ad uno studio sulla
teoria penale di G. W. F. Hegel’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -.

 The right of a state to punish by death
The modern conception of punishment retains a fossilised element
that regularly re-emerges because of public alarm and which, now, has
taken on a role also capable of conditioning the choices of the legislator
in criminal matters. It is not, therefore, a question of bringing a fossil
back to life, since the natural vengeance instinct once more numbers
among the reasons given to justify capital punishment and serves to
cultivate the consent that public opinion can recognise in the power
structure. The basis of the political motivation for the death penalty,
clearly, also depends on consenting to the political orientation of a
nation, that is on a sort of symbolic-expressive solution within which
the State considers it has to set up suitable defence mechanisms.
The fact remains, however, that the function of criminal sanctions
does not arise from the same need as that of the death penalty, because
the latter is dictated by its purpose, the ultimate institutional aim that
distinguishes between its nature and its function. It is no coincidence
that in modern times the death penalty has been applied when a
State has wanted to send a signal of political power in defence of the
established order. This has occurred so that justice could be seen to
be done with a precise dissuasive aim for acts that appear intolerably
serious in public opinion. Clear examples are provided by the trials
against dictatorial regimes such as the Nuremberg trial against the
Nazi regime and the trial of Adolf Heichmann whose death sentence
. In contemporary history and in the structural evolution of a modern legal order,
public opinion has been a decisive force for the affirmation of the political orientation of the
State and its legislation. Alfredo Rocco himself, in clarifying why the death penalty had to be
reinstated in criminal law, pointed out that it was “cried out for by the national conscience
[. . . ]. It satisfies an ancient desire of Italian thinking that - from Filangieri to Romagnosi,
Pellegrini Rossi, Vera, Manzini, Garofalo, Lombroso, for centuries, and without distinction
of thought or school - declared itself against the abolition or favourable to the restoration
of the death penalty” (’Sul ripristino della pena di morte in Italia’, in Opere legali, vol. III:
Scritti giuridici vari, Rome: Società Editrice del Foro Italiano, , p. ).
. M. P, Sistemi punitivi e ideologie (Naples: Morano, ).
. L. E, La pena ‘in crisi’. Il recente dibattito sulla funzione della pena (Brescia:
Morcelliana, ).
. On the wide-ranging scenario of international law, see L. F, ‘Il fondamento
filosofico del rifiuto della pena di morte e le sue implicazioni nella teoria del diritto’, in
F. Perez Alvarez (ed.), In memoriam Alexandri Baratta (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad
Salamanca, ), p. .
. A.  Z, ‘Der Nürnberger Prozess’, in A. Demandt (ed.), Macht und Recht, Grosse
Prozesse in der Geschichte (Munich: Beck, ), pp. -.
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did not wholly meet with public approval.
On the opposing ideological front, we should recall the emergency
criminal legislation of fascist Italy, when it was deemed indispensible to
defend the lives of the representatives of its own political institutions
using the death penalty. The reintroduction of the death penalty into
Italian law by the Rocco Code of  within a legal framework
based on the Zanardelli code, which did not envisage it, was made
possible thanks to the promulgation of law no.  of  November
. It should immediately be remarked that capital punishment
. As is well known, H. Arendt pointed out that the most common argument was
that Heichmann’s guilt was too great to be punished by men, and that the death penalty
was not proportional to crimes of that dimension; although this, of course, in one sense
was true, nevertheless it was absurd to sustain that, for that reason, someone who had
killed millions of human beings must evade punishment (Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report
on the Banality of Evil (New York, NY: Lotte Kohler, ); G. Hausner, ,, Accusers:
Israel’s Case Against Eichmann - The Opening Speech and Legal Argument of Mr. Gideon Hausner,
Attorney-General ( Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, ).
. Upon the murder of Giacomo Matteotti, Benito Mussolini declared in the House
of Deputies that he was against the reintroduction of the death penalty: “Death penalty?
But, we must be joking, gentlemen! First of all, the death penalty has to be introduced into
the criminal code and then anyway the death penalty cannot be a Government reprisal. It
must be applied after a fair, indeed, an extremely fair trail, when it is a matter of the life of
a citizen! It was at the end of that month which is deeply etched in my memory, that I said:
I want peace for the Italian people, and I wanted to establish normality in Italian politicial
life” (B. Mussolini, ‘Discorso alla Camera dei Deputati del  gennaio ’, now published
in G. Fedel, ed., Tre discorsi politici: frammenti di etica della responsabilità, Soveria Mannelli:
Rubettino, , pp. -).
. As M. Sbriccoli observes, “The death penalty, coming back into the legal systems
with the ‘most fascist laws’ of , was solidly reintroduced in the code, to mark a repressive
turning point which was meant to be drastic” (’Codificazione civile e penale’, , now in
Storia del diritto penale e della giustizia, Milan: Giuffrè, , vol. II, p. ). One learns in V.
Manzini, that “the first execution by firing squad shooting in the back under the  penal
code was of Diego Migneni, a self-confessed murderer, on  January , in Caltanissetta.
He had mistreated and killed a girl in Tallarita (Sicily), together with an accomplice, for
whom the death penalty was reduced to life imprisonment. The sentence was passed by
the Assize Court of Caltanissetta on st October . There followed the execution by
firing squad of Pietro Gavazzeni (Bergamo,  January ), Fioravante Arvati (Mantua, 
January ) and Giulio Sanna (Cagliari,  April )” (Trattato di diritto penale italiano, p.
).
. Law  November , n. , ‘Provvedimenti per la difesa dello Stato’. Cf. A.
R, ‘Legge sulla difesa dello Stato’, in Scritti e discorsi politici di Alfredo Rocco (Milan:
Giuffrè, ), p. . On this, see L. Crifò: “but before the Penal Code, published on 
October , the death penalty had already been restored to the State by the Revolution in
, through exceptional provisions dictated by one of those supreme needs that, in the life
of the State as in the life of individuals, have no laws and, responding to one of those excited
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in this case does not correspond in any precise way to the gravity or
the particular way in which the offence was committed, e. g., savage
and pre-meditated killing. In this case, in fact, the death penalty is only
reserved as a punishment for extremely serious cases established in
accordance with the criteria set out in Art.  of the penal code, i. e.
in consideration of the particularly aggravating circumstances.
For political crimes, on the other hand, the criterion of assessment
is connected with the teleological profile of the offence and has no-
thing to do with the objective gravity of the way the offence was
committed and the guilt of the perpetrator. The assessment of gravity
is inherent in the matter which is safeguarded by law, whose impor-
tance is due to the consideration which the legal order gives it during
the course of its history. Beccaria was careful to warn against this:
Another principle serves admirably to increasingly stress the im-
portant connection between the offence and its punishment, that is to
say that this should correspond as much as possible to the nature of
the crime. This analogy admirably facilitates the contrast that there
must be between the impulse to crime and the repercussions of pu-
nishment, i.e. that this should create a distance and lead the mind to
the opposite purpose to that where the seductive idea of breaking the
collective states of mind, which in particular moments in history, with total unanimity and
with eloquent and instinctive gestures in the defence of society, confirm the indisputable
value of certain penal institutions” (La pena di morte nello Stato fascista, Rome: Stabilimento
Tipografico Europa, , p. ). Cf. also M. S, ‘Il problema penale’ (), now in
Storia del diritto penale e della giustizia (Milan: Giuffrè, ), vol. I, p. ; A. A,
L’organizzazione dello Stato fascista (Turin: Einaudi, ), p. . It should be borne in mind
that, before the advent of fascism, even academic writing on crime had began to reconsider
the re-establishment of the death penalty, through the voice of one who would become
a high-profile theorist in later years: cf. V. M, ‘La politica criminale e il problema
della lotta contro la delinquenza comune e la malavita’, Riv. pen., LXXIII,  (), p. ff.; G.
T, Fascismo e pena di morte. Consenso e informazione (Milan: Franco Angeli, );
F. C, Criminalia. Nascita dei sistemi penali (Rome-Bari: Laterza, , p. ff ). Of
certain interest for an understanding of the issue of the relationship between the right to
punish and the political system is M. A. Cattaneo, Terrorismo e arbitrio. Il problema giuridico
del totalitarismo (Padua-Milan: Cedam, ). On the origins of the special fascist legislation,
see P. Troncone, Controllo penale e teoria del doppio Stato (Naples: ESI, ).
. The grounds for the various death sentences passed by the Special Court are
particularly illuminating. They are contained in Tribunale Speciale per la Difesa dello Stato,
‘Decisioni emesse nel ’, in Ministero della Difesa. Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito. Ufficio storico
(Rome, ).
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law would take it.
On this, the then Minister of Justice Alfredo Rocco wrote:
The individual is in fact a means to social ends, which go well
beyond life [. . . ]. When it is necessary, for the supreme reasons of
the defence of society and the State, to give a solemn warning and
example, and placate the just indignation of public opinion [. . . ], it is
perfectly legitimate to inflict on the individual the supreme sacrifice
by applying the death penalty.
This is why justifications for the need for the death penalty all lie
beyond the juridical context and are, in my opinion, fundamentally
two in number, as we shall see later on. But once again it is necessary
to return to Cesare Beccaria, who was the first to intuit that the death
penalty is not a legal institution but a choice grounded in the political
will, sometimes in open conflict with the system of law, but which is
however designated to dictate the rules. Where the threat of death is
meant to be purely dissuasive and generalised, the proportionality of
the gravity of the fact and the punishment is lost and even more so
the relationship between the punitive response and the teleological
perspective within which a modern legal order moves. Also prepara-
tory activities, including those constituting a concrete danger, even if
they do not result in a harmful event meriting death, are punished by
the maximum possible punishment. The collapse of the principle of
proportion that guarantees the rationality of retribution was brought
about by the special fascist law that equated an attempt on the life of
the King and the Head of State with their assassination.
But even before Beccaria the cruelty of the punishment was justi-
fied by the need to safeguard a vital public interest, and this synallagma
was already present in the doctrine expressed by the ancient sources
of law. Sextus Caecilius Africanus addresses the issue of the punish-
ment provided for in the XII tables and inflicted on Mettius Fufetius
who, despite being an ally of Tullus Hostilius, betrayed the Romans
. C. B, Dei delitti e delle pene (), with a Preface by S. Rodotà (Milan:
Feltrinelli, ), p. .
. ’Relazione al Disegno di Legge sulla Difesa dello Stato’ ( November ), in La
formazione dello Stato fascista, , p. . I cite a passage from A. Rocco, as quoted by F. C.
P, ‘Pena di morte e diritti umani (a proposito del Sesto Protocollo addizionale alla
Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo)’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), pp. -.
. S. M, Il diritto penale tra essere e valore, p. .
 The right of a state to punish by death
and was condemned to death by being torn apart. The need to resort
to this terrible torture was thought to be justified by the fact that
only through the threat of a terrible exemplary punishment could
the general interest of the public be safeguarded. Quite a different
situation arises when the perfect balance of the values at stake is called
to vouch for the ‘sense of justice’ in the application of the law.
. See also O. D, ‘La pena tra filosofia e diritto nelle Noctes Atticae di Aulo
Gellio’, .
Chapter V
Why the death penalty
cannot be considered a legal punishment
All the studies on the issue of the death penalty focus on rigorous
analytical investigations of the various theoretical positions that have
developed over time, subjectively assuming an abolitionist or anti-
abolitionist position, and ultimately justifying it from the simple sum
of the reasons militating in favour or against.
The method adopted is to my mind decisive: first of all, to ascertain
whether today the death penalty may be considered a punishment in
the legal sense (i. e., if law can justify it to some degree); secondly, to
distinguish its foundations, as in the case of all criminal sanctions, from
its purpose, which orients the death penalty towards a precise criminal
policy of an obviously functional type.
Concerning the appropriacy of assessing the punitive grounds of
the death penalty in the wider catalogue of sanctions, Fausto Giunta
rightly states:
like any other type of punishment, the justification or otherwise
of the death penalty depends above all on the criteria adopted for
. The difference between the “purpose” and the “function” of criminal punishment
is masterfully illustrated, in the context of much wider-ranging reasoning on the cultural
orientation of punishment (“no punishment without a purpose”), by G. F (Una
introduzione al sistema penale. Per una lettura costituzionalmente orientata, Naples: Jovene,
, p. ff.). From another angle, a revisitation of criminal doctrine from the constitutional
perspective over the last fifty years in Italy has favoured a teleological framework for
punishment. A criminal politics which is sensitive to the instances of the social rule of law
focused on the person cannot neglect the ultimate aim concerning the social integration of
the individual which penal sanctions are called to safeguard. In fact, the individual takes on
the dimension of ‘person’ and conserves it only when the fundamental rights and principles
expressed by the Constitution are respected. Only in this interpretation centred on the
person is it possible to elaborate a criminal policy of crimes and punishments respecting
the constitution and the prerequisites of the constitutional pact: cf. V. M, Clemenza e
sistema penale, p. ff.
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penal sanctions. So, essentially, also if we take the functions of punish-
ment as a starting point, there are no completely unequivocal and
satisfactory answers for or against the death penalty.
This approach, while being a child of its time, takes on the same
diachronic dimension posited by Francesco Carrara when, in identify-
ing the origin of punishment, he distinguished between its historical
and its legal origins. The former were based on the emotional desire
for vengeance inspiring it; the latter on arguments trying to justify pu-
nishment in a rational way and orienting it towards aims of a broader
significance for the system.
It seems to me that the various theoretical studies set out in this
way lead to a different direction from that of a precise conceptual
position within a system of punishment. In fact, the ontological mea-
ning of punishment expresses before all else the need for expiation, i.
e. suffering aﬄiction as a punishment for the offence committed. If
suffering in relation to the gravity of the offence is lacking, and with
it the temporal aspect of suffering, then the law has no justification
for its intervention, and - juridically speaking - the measure applied
does not comply with the canons of punishment. Punishment in the
legal sense, however, is legitimate when it is capable of showing the
meaning of the punishment, which is not limited only to the person
against whom it is directed. Lawful punishment roots its original
meaning in the need of society to show that it is able to prevent crime
in a dimension with a dual dynamic: one that causes the offender
ongoing suffering and one that provides a guarantee and assurance to
the others.
The doubtful nature of capital punishment as a legal sanction is an
issue taken up - albeit on the margins of the wide-ranging theoretical
. F. Giunta, ‘Riflessioni sulla pena di morte. A proposito del film Dead Man Walking’,
in R. Acquaroli (ed.), Casi criminali. Penalisti al cinema (Macerata: Eum, ), p. ff.
. F. C, Contro la pena di morte: Scritti di Francesco Carrara, ed. with an Intro-
duction by E. Palombi (Milan: IPSOA, ). On this point, see F. Mantovani, ‘Francesco
Carrara e la funzione della pena’, in Umanità e razionalità del diritto penale (Padua: Cedam,
), pp. -, p. . Carrara identified at least ten different theories - not always distin-
guishable one from another - to justify the grounds for punishment. Cf. also A. Prosperi,
‘Carrara e la pena capitale’, in Francesco Carrara nel ° centenario dalla morte, Proceedings of
the International Conference held in Lucca and Pisa, - June  (Milan: Giuffrè, ), pp.
-; S. M, ‘La polemica tra Carrara e Roeder sulla funzione della pena: disputa
ideologica?’, in Francesco Carrara nel ° centenario della morte, pp. -.
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debate in the criminal law tradition - during the fascist years between
the entry into force of the “most fascist law” and the  criminal
code. In particular, Conci hints at it in a very modest but significant
way in stating that: “the death penalty inspires repulsion and heated
debate and necessarily leads to a discussion of a philosophical, moral,
and political character, setting aside its true, juridical, nature”. It
is certainly a felicitous intuition which, given its historical context,
could not go far, but which today begs other questions and thus other
answers.
After taking our distance from the emotional aspects which the
death penalty involves (especially in the wake of the wide-spread mora-
torium produced by modern legislation) if, on the other hand, we take
into consideration the analytical models that provide a way of looking
at punishment today we have all the necessary theoretical prerequisi-
tes enabling us to identify the true nature of the death penalty. The
characteristics of the punitive model of the criminal system are in no
way recognisable in the meaning that capital punishment assumes; in
other words, capital punishment is a measure which responds to the
specific aims of a State, but which bears no relation to the constituent
and ontological characteristics of punishment in a legal order.
From the point of view of justice, the death penalty lacks the ele-
ment of degree which is the first criterion for selecting penal sanctions,
in the sense that substantial justice is only satisfied if the suffering in-
flicted is commensurate with - and proportional to - the gravity of the
act committed.
On the subject of the authentic legal nature of the death penalty
and the fact that it cannot be included in the category of penal sanc-
tions, for reasons of conceptual uniformity, another theory appears
particularly interesting, that of Hoche, which was described by the
criminal science of the time as belonging to “criminal futurism”.
. F. C, ‘Ancora la questione della pena di morte’, Rivista Giuridica del Mezzogiorno,
 (), -, . Conci further observes that “death is not a punishment, but the opposite,
because there is no more amendment, no repentance, no introspection, no shame, no
reparation; punishment must be certain and not mysterious and enigmatic like the Beyond”
(p. ).
. A. E. Hoche, ‘La pena di morte non è una pena’, Rivista di diritto penitenziario, 
(), - . Hoche’s article was sarcastically answered, in the same review, by G. Cuboni,
‘Veramente la morte non è una pena?’, Rivista di diritto penitenziario,  (), -.
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Hoche considered the death penalty a safety measure rather than a
circumstance rendering the offender punishable as a consequence of
the offence. On closer examination, the idea that the death penalty
may, however, satisfy the criterion of the ‘danger to society’ repre-
sented by the offender seems to fit perfectly with the functional use
that legislators have made of it over the centuries. This supposition
also removes the doubt on the criterion of the commensurate nature
of punishment, since in this case there is no relation between the
actual gravity of the act and the ultimate punishment. Only safety
measures which aim to punish the dangerous nature of the subject
justify the application of the death penalty with respect to acts which,
while being potentially serious, do not as yet cause concrete harm - as
in the case of attempting to take the life of the Head of Government
as provided for in the legislation of .
The reasonable doubt as to whether in fact the death penalty is a
sanction in the legal sense or whether it is a measure taken to defend
the system - which gives it a political aspect - contributes also to
its uncertain attribution to one discipline or the other. In fact, this
extreme measure is better situated in the field of public law, because
it does not respond to the logic of infraction-punishment but to the
need to remove the subject from the established order.
. This point will be thoroughly analysed with relation to the experience of the US;
however, the concept has already been exhaustively discussed by P. Ellero: “from the right
which society has to defend itself no right to punish arises, but one of war. The power to
punish is a specific right, distinctive, of its own kind; it is not the transformation of another
right. That society has this right in order to defend itself, in order to defend its legal order
is granted, but not however, that this can consist in the right to defence, in the true sense,
if there is no intention to change the necessary relationships among things” (Della pena
capitale, Venezia: Forni, , p. ).
Chapter VI
Problems of the compatibility between
the purpose of the death penalty
and the punishments available
in a system of criminal justice
The model of the American exception.
The idea of punitive efficientism
Legislation on the death penalty is normally connected with choices
relating to the legal order, in the sense that it appears to be greatly
influenced by the democratic or authoritarian character of the State or
of public order. On this, Manzini observed: “the death penalty thus
does not go against any political system, but only against the idea of a
number of philosophers or those who would philosophise, for whom
political needs have no value”.
The level of democratisation, which coincides with the centrality of
respect for fundamental human rights, should then appear inversely
proportional to choices concerning the death penalty. Despite this, the
United States of America maintains the death penalty in its ordinary
legislation, thus constituting an exception to the democratic character
. G. Fiandaca, Art. , section III Const., p. . Aldo Moro wrote in Lezioni di Istituzioni
di diritto e procedura penale: “The question of legalised murder is, in fact, an unthinkable
shame in a social and political democracy even if, it must be said, not only primitive and
unsophisticated orders, but also highly civilized legal systems with a great democratic
tradition contemplate, at least generally speaking, the death penalty which, despite efforts
even at international level, has not yet been abolished in numerous sovereign States” (p.
). As for the issue of the death penalty in socialist countries, cf. S. De Sanctis, ‘La pena
di morte nei Paesi socialisti’, Archivio penale,  (), -; on abolitionism in Eastern
Europe, see S. De Sanctis, ‘L’abolizione della pena di morte nella repubblica democratica
tedesca ed il suo permanere nella progettata riforma penale sovietica’, in Studi in memoria
di Pietro Nuvolone (Milan: Giuffrè, ), vol. III, p. .
. V. Manzini, Trattato di diritto penale italiano, p. .
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of the political orientation of the State. The ultimately contradictory
nature of this circumstance is highlighted by Sennet; concerning the
control exercised by totalitarian states, Sennet observes that, although
one might think that in the absence of a totalitarian regime political
control would loosen, in reality it is only the form that changes.
The issue of the death penalty is not the only aspect that contributes
to forming the idea that the American nation has many and such
singular characteristics that it would be inappropriate to speak in
terms of the American exception. In all cultural areas, in technological
research, in the racial make-up of its population and, lastly, in its
laws, the United States is always particularly original, so much so that
its experience is in no way comparable to the experience of other
democratic and industrialised countries: “the American exception
also consists in the ways and the times that the new civilisation has
developed in only a few centuries”. In other words, its cultural matrix
is as varied as to affect not only the different cultural aspects of life, but
especially the choices that the legislator is called upon to make in the
various fields of law. The religious traditions and the ethical/moral
profile of a number of individual life choices become collective, and
their impact on political and legal initiatives is certainly significant and
culturally rooted in the stuff of American society.
The question of the need for the death penalty in the third mil-
lennium has come to the fore again due to the issue of security po-
. R. Sennet, The Fall of Public Man. The choices of a political and legal system, then,
are not always a valid way of connoting it. Paradoxically, it very often happens that the
adoption of certain punishments is common to legal systems which take their inspiration
from very different concepts of freedom, and which make extreme choices - such as the
death penalty - in the light of completely different ideological prerequisites.
. The subject of capital punishment, widely addressed from the point of arguments
for and against, with much practical information, is discussed in R. M. Baird and Stuart
E. Rosenbaum (eds), Punishment and the Death Penalty. The Current Debate (Amherst, N.Y.:
Prometheus Books, ); A. Sarat (ed.), The Killing State. Capital Punishment in Law, Politics
and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).
. M. Teodori, Raccontare l’America. Due secoli di orgogli e pregiudizi (Milan: Mondadori,
), p. .
. In the ninenteenth century, this point had been developed by A. De Tocqueville, De
la democratie en Amerique (-); English tr. Democracy in America, intr. by Eric Plaag
(New York: Barnes & Noble, ). See also P. Ellero: “North American criminalists, in
line with the spirit of the reforms and the calculating nature of the nation, laying aside the
juridical aspect, normally discuss the question of the legitimacy of the death penalty from
the practical or religious point of view” (Della pena capitale, p. ).
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licies, in reality a version on the theme of public order as a modern
form of social control. Furthermore, the current concept of secu-
rity has also found a constitutional basis in Italy which not even the
nineteenth-century concept of public order had been able to affirm.
In countries where death is considered an ordinary instrument of
punishment it is not always easy to grasp what the real reasons justify-
ing recourse to the death penalty are. Over time various reasons have
been found, each presumably useful for justifying the basic choice - all
certainly indispensible to justify its specific use, case by case. Among
these, sometimes stands out the superabundance of religious reasons
which impose - as we have seen - the lex talionis, according to a gros-
sly compensatory-mercantile model of punishment. In other cases,
as has been seen recently, the choice has a functional basis with an
. L. Re, Carcere e globalizzazione. Il boom penitenziario negli Stati Uniti e in Europa (Rome-
Bari: Laterza, ). Moreover, the question is not extraneous even to the sixteenth-century
Italian tradition, as described by W. Kaiser, ‘Violenze urbane: alcune riflessioni sui linguaggi
del conflitto e le pratiche politiche nel mondo urbano’, Storica, VI,  (), -; E.
Dolcini, ‘Rieducazione del condannato e rischi di involuzioni neoretributive: ovvero della
lungimiranza del costituente’, Rassegna penitenziaria e criminologica, - (), -, now
updated in E. Cantarella, Il ritorno della vendetta. Pena di morte: giustizia o assassinio? (Milan:
Rizzoli, ), pp. -.
. Corte Cost. (Constitutional Court)„ ‘Sentence nr.  July , nr. ’, Foro it., ,
I, c. : “the functions and the administrative duties relating to public order and public
safety concern preventive and strict measures for the maintenance of public order, which
is to be understood as all the fundamental wealth of law and primary public interests
on which ordered and civil co-existence in the nation rests, as well as the safety of the
institutions, the citizens and their property. It should be clarified that this definition adds
nothing to the traditional notion of public order and safety as handed down in the case
law of this Court, which reserves to the State functions primarily aiming to safeguard
basic goods, such as the physical or emotional well-being of the people, the protection of
property and all other goods that take on primary importance for the very existence of the
system”.
. M. Cerase, ‘La pena di morte negli Stati Uniti: nuovi sviluppi e vecchi contra-
sti’, Giurisprudenza costituzionale,  (), -; E. Botti, ‘L’ottavo emendamento della
costituzione americana: la pena di morte’, Danno e responsabilità, - (), -.
. G. Marinucci, ‘La pena di morte’, p. ff.
. For example, according to Islamic law, three choices are offered to the relations
of the victims: to ask for the enforcement of the sentence, to save the life of the killer
with the blessing of God; or to pardon him in exchange for a payment in money, called
‘blood money’ (diya). Over the last few years, numerous cases of blood money have been
favourably resolved in Saudi Arabia. The Iranian version of blood money states that for
a female victim it amounts to half that of a man. Also, if a woman is killed, a man may
not be executed, even if condemned to death, unless the woman’s family first pays the
murderer’s family half of the blood money.
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economic and financial emphasis - as in contemporary China, where
the maintenance of a convict in prison is seen as a cost to the State
and where guaranteeing organs for transplants constitutes a new and
terrible frontier of human exploitation. The Chinese penal system
has seen an enormous increase in crimes punished by death during
the eighties, not only for blood crimes, but above all for ‘social’ cri-
mes - i. e. crimes to the detriment of the economic and social system
of the country. All in all, this is a confirmation of the political and
ideological option for a form of exemplary punishment to discourage
any kind of conduct which is harmful to the stability of the system of
government.
On closer examination, from the contemporary historical point of
view, there appear to be two reasons - or, as said above, purposes - for
. Laogai Research Foundation, Cina, traffici di morte. Il commercio degli organi dei
condannati a morte, ed. by M. V. Cattania-T. Brandi (Turin: Editori Guerini & Associati,
). On this point it may be useful to reflect on the aspects of an economic analysis of
the law but also, with regard to the specific sector of criminal legislation, on the economic
costs of crime and punishment, according to the approach suggested by D. D. Friedman
(Law’s Order. What Economy Has To Do with Law and Why It Matters, Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, ). There is no shortage of examples in legal literature
concerning the effective deterrent of punishment from the economic point of view, i. e.
the impact of the actual benefit that the criminal would gain from the offence through
a prison sentence: cf. J. Elster, who observes that if we aim to dissuade an individual
from stealing significant funds which he has in his care, in order to offset the attraction
that they hold, we should punish this crime with a penalty which is proportional to the
consistency of the funds - thus, it is the fear of the penalty that leads individuals to resist
temptation (which he considers as one of the forms of the weakness of the will) (Agir
contre soi. La faiblesse de volonté, Paris: Odile Jacob, ). In reality, this approach appears
nearer to a moral criterion than to any legal basis for punishment. Concerning the context
where criminal behaviour develops, mathematical parameters to identify the interaction of
multiple individual and environmental factors reveal themselves to be inadequate, as shown
by the National Research Council (U. S.) in Deterrence and incapacitation: estimating the effect
of criminal sanctions on crime rates, ed. A. Blumstein, J. Cohen and D. Nagin (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, ). Nineteenth- century criminology in Italy used
the same expression to designate the inclination to crime: see C. Lombroso, Sull’incremento
del delitto in Italia e sui mezzi per arrestarlo (Turin: Bocca, ). Lombroso attributed
behaviour oscillating between vice and virtue, and so the inclination that leads to crime, to
the “weakness of character” of the perpetrator.
. C. Zhonglin, ‘Una svolta storica nel diritto penale cinese: l’introduzione di un nuovo
codice’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -; Id., ‘Profili storici e problemi contemporanei
del diritto penale cinese’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -. On the application of the
death penalty in other countries, detailed information is provided by F. E. Zimring, The
Contradictions of American Capital Punishment (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press,
).
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the State, be it democratic or totalitarian, to include the death penalty
among its legal punishments. And these are, in my modest opinion,
two reasons which, while having ancient roots, certainly respond to
the current needs of a system of government and criminal policy
qualified by their aim.
Given that - as already stated - the death penalty arises from a
different basis than the traditional function of penal sanctions, its
application is grounded on the need to punish conduct that betrays
the fundamental values of the State system as well as hostile conduct
that puts the stability of the system of Government in jeopardy. This
conduct may include hostile or destabilising factors from outside or
from within the State itself.
The lucid awareness that induces a legislative system to include
the death penalty among its remedies centres on a basically political
choice, where the law and the coherence of a teleologically ordered
and oriented system merely introduce a remedy whose conceptual ju-
stification is rooted in a different set of arguments, which are different
from its premises.
This is presumably the reasoning that keeps capital punishment
alive in legal systems representing values in apparent conflict with
the right of the State to take life. In fact, the centrality of life as a
supreme value in the foundation of the social and legal order appears
to be culturally and ideologically irreconcilable with the possibility
of resorting - even as an extrema ratio - to taking life by the State
albeit as a criminal sanction. It may be deduced that the concept
of the American exception rests on an apparent contradiction, but
in substance the choice to execute is the natural consequence of a
concatenation of events that may be traced back to political strategy.
The political choices in fighting against crime are all based on a logic of
‘efficiency’, that is they try to assuage the social need for punishment
as an instrument to fight the forms of violent crime that burgeon
in society and to guarantee the peace and the pacific continuation of
social and personal life.
Both the death penalty in ordinary procedure envisaged by Ameri-
can criminal legislation and the emergency procedure provided for
. For a detailed historical treatment of the death penalty, cf. S. Banner, The Death
Penalty. An American History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ).
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under the Patriot Act of  November  are perfectly in line with
the purpose which that legal order has assigned to its own system.
Failure to comply with the social contract as a form of infidelity
to the fundamental values of American co-existence must necessari-
ly bring about extreme punishments to guarantee the safety of the
basis of the system’s stability. All the options, whether retributive or
preventive, are in some way understandable. But the ultimate choice
which leads the legislator to opt for capital punishment is not coherent
with other forms of punishment, since the utilitarian nature of legal
sanctions cannot be reconciled in any way with the functionalism
characterising the choice to adopt the death penalty.
The American case is not the only one to make up the paradigm
of choices on the subject of capital punishment. The first version of
the Charter of the European Union signed in Rome on th October
 went in the same direction: in fact, Art.  proclaimed the “right
to life” (“. All people have the right to life.. No-one shall be con-
demned to the death penalty, nor executed”), and in the note thereto
it reiterated the content of Art.  of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome
on th November  as “the right to life”:
. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No-one shall
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a
sentence of a court following his conviction for a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.
. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention
of this article when it results from a use of force which is no
more than absolutely necessary: a. in defence of any person
from unlawful violence; b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or
to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; c. in action
lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
It thus appears evident that also in this context the death penalty
seems to be forbidden as an ordinary form of punishment, but need
for it is admitted in situations of alarm or danger to the established
order. It is not a repressive measure as often found in a typical punitive
system, where each punishment is specific to each possible crime,
but a general protective measure with extreme effects in relation to
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acts which are not expressly defined, such as the concept of riot or
insurrection whose nature, and especially in the case of the concept
of unlawful violence, gives rise to political measures for protecting
the system. To come full circle in terms of the sources which, while
moving towards a drastic reduction in the practice of the death penalty,
allowed it in specific and limited cases, we recall Protocol  of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
relating to the abolition of the death penalty, amended by protocol nr. .
This Act, concluded in Strasbourg on  April , established the
possibility of allowing capital punishment solely “for acts committed
in time of war” or when there was “imminent danger of war”.
An examination of the supranational sources shows that recourse to
the death penalty does not always appear to be prohibited, as solemnly
but uselessly proclaimed, but is normally tolerated. This means that
the aim is not retribution, but that even here the death penalty has the
exclusive function of intimidation. No crimes are mentioned which,
according to long-standing tradition, deserve punishment by death,
such as murder or massacre, but essentially preparatory conduct, cha-
racterised by great danger to the stability of the political institutions.
So, once again, we have the question of the betrayal of sovereignty and
the sense of generalised intimidation aiming to dissuade people from
committing socially harmful acts, destabilising acts of hostility or war
which require a strong and definitive response regarding the fate of
the enemy. If then one considers that these rules are contained in the
. The considerations that may be expressed almost thirty years after the normative
content of Protocol VI must take into account the historical framework of the period in
which the European agreement was drawn up. Although today it appears inadequate in
relation to the main principles of a democratic legal system based on respect for the dignity
and the life of the human person, Protocol VI represented in its day a decisive step forward
towards the abolition of the death penalty. On the importance of the dispositions of the
treaty, it is necessary to return to the considerations of F. C. Palazzo: “the pre-eminent
importance of additional Protocol VI to the Treaty of Rome - in our opinion - resides in
the fact that it, the only international document affirming the abolitionist principle, is thus
able to make a particular contribution to the rationalisation of the question of the death
penalty” (’Pena di morte e diritti umani’, p. ).
. The text may be read, albeit in reduced form, in Riv. it. dir e proc. pen.,  (),
-.
. This subject has been addressed with outstanding modernity by G. Carmignani:
“A man is killed in battle as he is killed on the scaffold. This observation leads to another,
which is of great importance in discussions on the death penalty from the legal point of
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draft of the European Constitution - i. e., in the highest constitutional
level of the organisation of a State - there is evident confirmation of a
functional consideration of death as a form of punishment, with clear
indications that the death penalty is essentially meant to be a safeguard
for the system, lying outside the field of criminal law and choices in
criminal policy.
In the context of a well organised social system with a mature
structure to its personal relationships and respecting the basic rights
of the individual it is possible to give the lie to the formula attributed
to Seneca “Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur”
(“No prudent person punishes because a wrong has been committed,
but so that no-one commits a wrong”). This maxim, even if consi-
dered from the utilitarian point of view, seems to mark the failure
of the death penalty, as shown by the statistics, because death is not
that terrible deterrent that many would wish it to be. From a strictly
legal point of view, the preventive function does not connote - and
cannot reasonably connote - the death penalty. If, on the other hand,
we consider the political end, capital punishment serves its purpose
perfectly, as the hostility shown by the aggressor justifies the hosti-
lity with which the State is called to defend itself. The death penalty
must radically change direction, and mark a clear break with the past
and tyrannical power structures which must give way to new social
scenarios.
The debate on the punitive basis of death is also obscured by much
view” (Una lezione accademica sulla pena di morte, p. ).
. P. Nuvolone: “There is no doubt that an efficacious criminal policy cannot prescind
from the intimidation exerted by the threat of punishment and its actual enforcement in
relation to those who break the law. It is extremely doubtful, furthermore, whether the
death penalty has such an effect” (’La pena di morte’, p. ). Over time, the competent
offices of the United Nations have commissioned numerous studies on the death penalty
throughout the world, in order to ascertain its actual utility, but above all to understand
the justifications and the plausibility of its use in countries where it does exist. These are
empirical field studies which have allowed the production and the publication of three
separate reports: M. Ancel, Capital Punishment (New York: United Nations - Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, ); N. Morris, Capital Punishment. Developments -
(New York: United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ); R. Hood,
The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ; rev. ed.
). On the developments of the debate on deterrent and dissuasion, see A. Marchesi, La
pena di morte. Una questione di principio (Rome-Bari: Laterza, ), pp. ff.; F. E. Zimring,
The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment.
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more concrete - or worrying - circumstances, such as those concerning
protection from legal error:
The only valid argument against the death penalty is the irreparabi-
lity of such a punishment in the event of judicial error. But this is a
practical argument. Beccaria himself, considered to be an abolitionist,
in reality is not, when - after accepting the ideological and methodolo-
gical prerequisites of the social contract - he recognises that the death
penalty may be called upon in cases of need when it is necessary to
defend society.
It turns out that it is precisely judicial error which constitutes the
only true obstacle to the generalised adoption of the death penalty.
In reality, what is lost in this case is the right to judicial review (another
of the rights rooted in the normative terrain of the fair trial), and the
President’s pardon, if, at a time after the judgment, irrefutable proof
of innocence of the condemned person should come to light. But
anxiety about the irreparable nature of the penalty was appeased by
the Minister of Justice Alfredo Rocco in this way:
The argument of irreparability is perhaps the most compelling. Yet,
it is not decisive either. Error is unfortunately an inevitable element
in human nature and if the fear of falling into it were to stop us from
acting, all individual and social life would remain in paralysis. The
irreparability of the punishment cannot but lead to a single conse-
. G. Bettiol, ‘Sulle massime pene: morte ed ergastolo’; G. Marinucci, ‘Beccaria penali-
sta, nostro contemporaneo’, in S. Moccia (ed.), Diritti dell’uomo e sistema penale (Naples:
ESI, ), vol. I, pp. -.
. This argument was supported forcefully by Beccaria and even more so by Robe-
spierre (Discours sur la peine de mort,  May , in Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre, VII,
Paris: PUF, , p. ff ). The reports on the work of the Commission set up by Governor
George Ryan of Illinois to establish the utility of the death penalty are interesting reading.
The work of the Ryan Commission coincided with a moratorium on the death penalty
for all convicts awaiting execution. The Commission reached the conclusion that it was
inopportune to apply the death penalty due to the enormous number of judicial errors
recorded over the years, for which no remedy was possible. In , Governor Ryan, in
the light of these results, commuted all capital sentences into life sentences: cf. S. Turow,
Ultimate Punishment. A Lawyer’s Reflections on the Death Penalty (New York: Farrar, Straus
& Giroux, ); N. Christie, Limits to Pain. The Role of Punishment in Penal Policy (Oxford:
Robertson, ).
. This question too was widely discussed by nineteenth-century thinkers, being just
one piece of the puzzle in the wide-ranging debate which never found peace. Cf. M. P. Geri,
‘Carmignani, Birnbaum e altri incidenti (momenti del dibattito ottocentesco intorno alla
pena di morte)’, L’ind. pen,  ( January-June), -, .
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quence: that of subordinating enforcement to particular precautions.
This must also be so for the death penalty, which must not be applied
unless the evidence is clear and the responsibility of the guilty party
robustly ascertained.
It thus appears very probable that from a modern legal perspective,
the grounds justifying death as a punishment are precisely in the
middle between the punitive basis and the purpose, but are always ba-
sed on a need external to the penal system to make use of the maximum
degree of punishment possible.
The truly controversial aspect of the question is the fact that tra-
ditional arguments are being posited which had previously been re-
jected, considering the current cultural and ideological framework
of advanced social systems as in the case of many contemporary
legal orders. Yet, a return to the past has been made possible by
neo-conservative cultural models which have opened the way for the
widespread security initiatives of recent years, according to which the
protection of the current system - i. e., the protection of the rights
of the public - can be guaranteed only by acknowledging its predo-
minance over the rights of the individual. As a consequence of this,
the punitive response must be of an asymmetrical retributionary kind,
affecting the most alarming aspects of the general-preventive option,
namely deterrence.
A significant fact needs to be mentioned in relation to the legisla-
tions that have historically and variously included the death penalty
and then suddenly removed it. Especially in Italy, considering the co-
des from the time pre-dating unification, and taking into consideration
the temporarily introduced special laws, it is clear that feelings and
. ’Relazione al re del Codice Penale’, in V. Manzini, Trattato di diritto penale italiano, p.
.
. In his Punishment and Modern Society, D. Garland recalls that Durkheim, like the
historians of his time, considers that ‘intense’ and ‘severe’ punishments are typical of simple
societies, while in modern societies punishments are considerably milder. In order to prove
this, Durkheim lists - in a more descriptive than analytical way - the various sufferings and
atrocities envisaged in the penal systems of ancient societies; for instance, in the various
populations of Syria criminals were stoned, pierced by arrows, hanged, crucified, and so on.
. The long journey towards abolitionism imposed by the Italian Constitution of 
is well illustrated by L. Goisis, ‘La revisione dell’ Art. , comma  della Costituzione:
l’ultima tappa di un lungo cammino’, Riv .it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -.
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value judgments on capital punishment have tended to alternate.
This legislative variable can actually correspond to the cultural
variable which manifests itself in a historical period when humani-
tarianism takes the upper hand over conservative and state-oriented
instincts.
The response to this affirmation is provided in the ratification of
Protocol nr.  of the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concluded in Vilnius on rd May .
The protocol commits the various States of the European Union to
abolish the death penalty in all cases, including the riots and insur-
rections mentioned above. With Act nr.  of th October ,
Italy, in granting the ratification of the additional protocol, solemnly
proclaimed in Art.  that the death penalty “is abolished in all circum-
stances”, thus revoking the reserve of Art.  of the “European Union
Charter” of .
Also the cultural spheres which cultivate the idea of forgiveness
as a central element for reflection sometimes inevitably concede
the necessity of the death penalty, despite a general orientation to
the contrary: Ecclesia non sitit sanguinem. The paradox lies in being
forced to recognise the ultimate contradiction of such a choice within
an overall framework of values, as when the orders “Let no-one
. The first strong legislative signal favouring the abolition of the death penalty, shortly
before the implementation of the Republican Constitution, was the Presidential Decree
of nd June , Nr.  - Amnistia e indulto per reati comuni, politici e militari, which in art.
 commuted the death penalty to the life sentence for all crimes committed after the
liberation.
. M. A. Cattaneo, ‘Karl Ferdinand Hommel, il Beccaria tedesco’, in G. Tarello (ed.),
Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, pp. -, p. . The theme throughout the
whole work is the humanitarianism that links the two protagonists, Hommel and Beccaria,
on the abolitionist front, even if Hommel admits the death penalty as an exception for a
broader range of crimes. What is of major interest is the fact that, in affirming retributional
principles, Hommel recognises as binding - and perhaps for the first time - the criterion of
proportion between the gravity of the act and the degree of punishment.
. Published in Gazz.Uff. (th November  nr.  - Suppl. ordin. nr. ).
. On topics concerning guilt and punishment in general, see E. Pessina, ‘Lezioni sulla
pena di morte’, in Pel cinquantesimo anno di insegnamento di Enrico Pessina (Naples: Trani,
), vol. I, pp. -; E. Wiesnet, Die verratene Versohnung; F. Cavalla, Pena e riparazione
(Padua: Cedam, ); R. Botta, La norma penale nel diritto della Chiesa (Bologna: il Mulino,
), p. ff; K. Rahner, ‘Schuld-Verantwortung-Strafe in der Sicht der katholischen
Theologie’, in Schriften zur Theologie, VI (Benziger, Einsiedeln, ), pp. -. From a
historical perspective, see I. Mereu, La morte come pena, p. ff.
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harm Cain; whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on
him sevenfold!” (Genesis .) or “forgive seventy times seven” or
again “judge not and ye shall not be judged, condemn not and ye
shall not be condemned; forgive and ye shall be forgiven” (Gospel of
St. Luke , ) inexplicably cohabit with the dictat of the catechism
of the Catholic Church (nr. ) which still requires, albeit in an
exceptional case, the death penalty. On the theme of guilt and pardon,
the evangelical sources contain one of the topoi of the expiation of a
guilt which can only be brought about through death because of the
impossibility of finding human pardon on account of the enormity of
the act committed: the suicide of Judas. Iscariot sentenced himself
to death by suicide that he himself saw as the only penalty adequate
for having betrayed Jesus, convinced that no-one would be able to
grant him forgiveness. In this case, the death penalty represents the
inevitable consequence of a “necessary guilt”.
From another angle, the question of the death penalty causes irre-
solvable cultural disagreement in the United States of America where
it is also seen in terms of reparation, but this justification finds little
credit in a nation that puts fundamental human rights at the heart
of its values. The well-known American exception, as we have said,
. With the Vatican law of  June, , n. II, art. , the death penalty was envisaged for
attempts on the life, the safety or personal freedom of the Pope and for attempting to take
the life of Heads or governors of foreign States.
. Capital punishment in Church law has always been a thorny and controversial
issue in the relationship between the legal order of the Vatican State and the theological
and pastoral Magisterium. A radical and decisive revision of the question was imposed
by the encyclical Evangelium vitae in which John Paul II carried out a thorough criticism
of the whole cultural journey concerning punishment in relation to the choices of the
international Charters on human rights. Despite this, the death penalty was not completely
cancelled out, rather it was deemed only a vestige to be kept alive in positive law but which
could be used “in cases of absolute need”. For all further implications, see G. Thibon, ‘Pena
di morte?’, Studi cattolici (),  and M. Pisani, ‘Appunti sul tema: Chiesa cattolica e
pena di morte’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -.
. The human and theological issue is amply and wisely discussed by G. Zagrebelsky:
“in a religion that professes a charitable God, it is not easy to think that He may have chosen
someone to commit a guilty act” (Giuda: il tradimento fedele, ed. by G. Caramore, Brescia:
Morcelliana, , p. ).
. The motto which clearly confirms this is “I don’t want vengeance, but justice”, in F.
Stella, La giustizia e le ingiustizie (Bologna: il Mulino, ), p. . The roots of the ancient
law suggest that vengeance was described as “poinè”, exactly as today one uses the term
“penalty”, and that it represented the concept of the litigant who imposed compensation,
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is a cause for reflection on the punitive basis of the death penalty in
a modern democracy, where one hopes for the manifestation of an
Age of Rights rooted in constitutional values in which respect for the
human person is central. A clear conceptual framework is traced in
this respect by Garland, who observes that, from another standpoint,
the death penalty may be seen as an efficacious symbol of the last cru-
sade against crime which, in turn, encapsulates many fears, as well as
many racial and class conflicts within American society. Therefore, in
policy on crime the question of the death penalty is more “symbolic”
than “instrumental” - which is largely confirmed by the great number
of delinquents condemned to death without the sentence ever being
carried out. As Garland further notes, the fact that this punishment
is so popular in the United States does not mean that this country is
different from the others, given that in all countries public opinion has
shown the same attitudes for many years after its abolition. In many
abolitionist countries, therefore, the death penalty survives only as a
symbol which can be evoked whenever it turns out to be politically useful.
cf. F. Ost, Reconter la loi.
. D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society.

Chapter VII
The death penalty:
from a punitive measure
to a means of safeguarding
the established order
The destiny of an inexpressive symbology
Having established that the death penalty has, especially over the last
two centuries, become a typical political choice, it is reasonable to con-
sider the death of a condemned person as an aberration with respect
to the other penalties available in contemporary legal systems. The
ultimate political purpose of safeguarding the system in a historical
period where opposing forces could destabilise its foundations, deter-
mines the discrepancy between the concept of purpose and that of the
function of criminal punishment. Whenever a state resorts to capi-
tal punishment, it invariably places the purpose before the function
(which draws on the numerous and traditional theories of absolu-
te punishment and relative sentences). The purpose penalises and
frustrates the intention of the legislator who sees death as the form
of intimidation par excellence, so the penalty becomes only a symbol
expressing the power of the State, useless and meaningless from the
point of view of preventative dissuasion. From this standpoint, the
. Cf. A. Blumstein et al. (eds), Deterrence and incapacitation, where it is affirmed that the
death penalty is markedly influenced by political and social factors much more important
than the “deterrent” of the punishment itself.
. On this point see F. C. Palazzo: “Usually, the hypotheses of exceptionalness, and thus
the limits of the lawfulness of the death penalty, are found on two distinct levels: that of the
type of crime, which - being particularly serious - could justify capital punishment, and that
of the objective situation in which the crime is committed, which - being characterised by
a contingent state of particular weakness of the structure of the State or the extraordinary
dimensions of the phenomenon of crime - would make capital punishment legitimate”
(’Pena di morte e diritti umani’, ).

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considerations of Norberto Bobbio perfectly grasp the meaning of
Cesare Beccaria’s reasoning which, although rooted in still unfertile
cultural terrain in terms of human rights, sounds very modern to
contemporary societies.
There are numerous examples to confirm this hypothesis, all of
which may be found among the choices of capital punishment which
have been adopted in various States to address situations of extreme
gravity concerning security and as a guarantee of the stability of their
order. They are, however, choices driven essentially by the need for
pragmatism and readiness in the punitive response which also looks
in a new and different way at the phenomenon of crime. The opening
of the gap between policy on crime and a policy to safeguard the
security of the system has been much discussed in recent years, but
it is an ancient question enriched by the experience accrued in the
past under various regimes and always governed by a different set of
laws. It is also true that the ideological view of the “political crime”
has always been the ideal functional link to capital punishment, with
. N. Bobbio, L’età dei diritti, p. .
. In this vast area, it may be useful to consult S. Staiano (ed.), Le politiche legislative di
contrasto alla criminalità organizzata (Naples: Jovene, ). On the relationship between
lawful violence and the public interest cf. S. Cotta: “(tolerated violence) is justified when
the general interest (i. e., the common political well-being) is opposed to the particular
interest of those in power, expressed by their power of command. Secondly, when an
ultimate and true value of epistème is in opposition to the contingent and apparent value of
dòxa, of opinion” (Il diritto come sistema di valori, Turin: San Paolo, , p. ).
. L. Wacquant, Le prisons de la misère (Paris: Editions Raisons d’agir, ); M. Maiwald,
‘Diritto e Potere’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (), -; M. Donini, ‘Metodo democratico e
metodo scientifico nel rapporto tra diritto penale e politica’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,  (),
- ; M. Donini, Il volto attuale dell’illecito penale. La democrazia penale tra differenziazione e
sussidiarietà (Milan: Giuffrè, ).
. G. Vassalli, ‘Le aporie del delitto politico’, in Sodalitas. Scritti in onore di Antonio
Guarino (Naples: Jovene, ), vol. IX, pp. -.
. Of particular interest are the considerations formulated by the French legal doctrine
of the mid-nineteenth century on the purpose of the death penalty called to stand watch
over the punishment of political crimes. France had developed its policies on punishment
for political crimes in the light of the French revolution. See on this, in his work on
capital punishment, F. Guizot. Guizot observes that in the past the death penalty found
its justification, if not in the violence of political passions (as violence of political passions
continues - and will continue - to be great), in the human substance of the personalities on
which they operated. In the past, he argues, political struggles, like war, were man-to-man
fights, between more or less equal opponents, and the destinies of lives were bound to
the destinies of power. The death penalty was like a kind of lex talionis, adequate not only
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all the limits which the category of those crimes has demonstrated
over the centuries across the various legislations:
It is above all for political crimes, given the elasticity and the varia-
bility of the notion in time and space, that the death penalty must be
abolished in all circumstances. The true abolitionist is not so much
worried about the death penalty for the perpetrator of a massacre
or a rapist murderer, as about the death penalty for one who has
carried out “politically criminal acts” against interests which can be
considered political by those who hold the reins of power.
Today, the true bastion is represented by the incontrovertible af-
firmation of the fundamental human rights which are still a yardstick
for the choices regarding crime control. But, against any extreme
penal measure, the fundamental human rights are required to play
the opposite role, that of defending the position of all the other mem-
bers of society against the undeserving minority whose position is
diametrically opposed to the values of the system. A sort of ultra-rigid
disapplication to the detriment of a few against a disproportionate applica-
tion to the advantage of all the others: “the criminal law concerning the
enemy always creates a logic of war, of separation, a state of exception
in the persons responsible: they should be neutralised and fought,
excluded or annihilated”.
The pragmatic approach of the United States of America to the
social need for law, and in particular to the death penalty, explains why
it uses death penalty in terms of purpose, as pure intimidation which
expresses itself in the fact that atrocious crimes must no longer be
committed. It is an approach that sets aside philosophical doctrines
and theoretical justifications. With the national tragedy of the destruc-
tion of the Twin Towers in , President George Bush deemed the
death penalty a special deterrent in the fight against the crime of orga-
on the level of ideas, but also to the de facto conditions; and danger was impending and
personal as in battle (F. Guizot, Des conspirations et de la justice politique).
. G. Bettiol, ‘Sulla pena di morte’, p. .
. M. Donini, Il volto attuale dell’illecito penale (Milan: Giuffrè, ), p. ; M. Donini,
‘Il diritto penale di fronte al “nemico”’, Cass.pen.,  (), -. For the implications in
international law, see A. Aponte, ‘Jakobs, il diritto penale del nemico e il “caso colombiano”’,
Studi sulla questione criminale, I,  (), -; A. Cavaliere, ‘Diritto penale “del nemico” e
“di lotta”: due insostenibili legittimazioni per una differenziazione secondo tipi di autore,
nella vigenza dei principi costituzionali’, in A. Gamberini and R. Orlandi (eds), Delitto
politico e diritto penale del nemico (Bologna: Monduzzi, ), pp. -.
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nised terrorism, further strengthened by the Patriot Act , whose
second article extended the death penalty to terrorists responsible
for hijacking. Yet there is a marked contradiction, because what is
called into play as the most serious option provided for in law is the
most significant paradigm of the violation of human rights through
systematic use of the death penalty.
On the other hand, in the strategy of the American punitive model,
there is a central factor that calls for recourse to the death penalty
and is represented by the role of the victims, so it all seems to be
part of a logic of compensation and retribution as a guarantee on
the part of the State (the avenger/injured party oxymoron). The
centrality of the role of the injured parties or the relatives of the
victims is certainly a characteristic typical of the American system,
even if similarly vengeful overtones are not lacking in other countries
where the death penalty is enforced and where the “blood debt” is
expected. American scholars have remarked that, although vengeance
is something of the past, and has a terrible reputation, there is the need
for a better solution to qualify in a positive way the involvement of the
relations of the victims in capital punishment, something which could
sound civilized and advanced at the same time. Reference is often
made to closure, that is to say the feeling of satisfaction arising from the
definitive conclusion of a bad and shocking experience. Years after
the end of the trial, for the relatives and the friends of the victims,
the execution becomes the occasion to reach a conclusion on the
psychological and emotional level (psychological closure) to the events
in which they had been involved, a time when the tension and the
uncertainties of the period leading up to the execution are dissipated,
and when it is thought that relatives may be liberated from the weight
. A. M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works. Understanding the Threat, Responding to the
Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, ).
. H. Prejean, The Death of Innocents (New York, N. Y: The Random House, ).
. F. E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment (Oxford-New York:
Oxford University Press, ).
. F. E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment. Zimring further
observes how the majority of people is likely to feel a sense of relief at the thought that,
after the execution, all the uncertainty about the result of the case, the constant and invasive
interest of the public and the continued repetition by the media of the facts regarding the
murder, will eventually come to an end.
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of the pain and anger they felt for the loss caused by the killing.
Nor can we disregard the recent results of clinical neuropsychological
research which localise the mental processes of vengeance in the same
part of the brain where the area governing pleasure is located.
A new move towards a humane way of working through suffering
and towards reconciliation with the perpetrator of a crime is being
made today through initiatives for national reconciliation, in the wake
of mass crimes, and on an inter-individual scale through a process of
mediation, needed to build up a framework where the recognition of
the damage done and the prevention of wrongdoing are central.
Nevertheless, what is not pointed out is that the issue of capital
punishment does not give due consideration to the “harshness of
suffering” which punishment for crime must guarantee. Paradoxically,
the greatest possible suffering through expiation, as has been observed
since Beccaria onwards, is perpetual imprisonment, which certainly
offers greater guarantees as far as aﬄiction is concerned. In this way,
in fact, the concept of punishment is turned on its head so that the
penalty to be paid is not death, and the true punishment is to live since,
after the sentence is passed, life consists simply in suffering with no
possibility of redemption. The death penalty is in reality one of the
typical forms of, perhaps, a vestige of corporal punishment, possibly
the most cruel, and one that is considered the most dissuasive due
to the evocative power of the ways it is carried out. Ancient texts
. Cf. F. E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment.
. The problem of working through the killing of a loved one from the psychological
point of view is also discussed in medical studies, as indicated by W. I. Miller, Eye for an Eye
(ch. , n. ). International law too has produced solutions which, in the working through
of ferocious crimes, can lead to an end to hostilities between different ethnic groups: cf. A.
Garapon, Des Crimes qu’on ne peut ni punir ni pardonner. Pour une justice internationale (Paris:
Odile Jacob, ).
. Lastly, of particular significance is G. Fiandaca and C. Visconti (eds), Punire mediare
riconciliare. Dalla giustizia penale internazionale all’elaborazione dei conflitti individuali (Turin:
Giappichelli, ).
. Concerning life imprisonment, among the founders of the positivist school is R.
Garofalo, “It is not easy to see the utility in keeping alive beings who must no longer
be part of society, nor can one understand the purpose of maintaining this purely animal
existence: it is inexplicable why citizens, and consequently the family of the victims, should
pay yet more levies to accommodate and feed eternal enemies of society” (Criminologia.
Studio sul delitto, sulle sue cause, e sui mezzi di repressione, Bocca: Turin, , p. ).
. On the various ways of inflicting suffering, see the authoritative work by M. Foucault,
 The right of a state to punish by death
provide precise and detailed reports of the various ways of producing
suffering in the body of the accused; cruel methods and treatment
intended to cause suffering before the execution of the death sentence.
The traditional reference is that which emerges in the story of the trial
of Jesus of Nazareth. Crucifixion was the most painful punishment
imaginable at that time and was adopted by the Romans as a warning
message to the potential enemies of Rome.
The basis for choosing to allow capital punishment is first and
foremost the organisation of the hierarchy of values typifying the
legal system of a State at a specific moment in its history. When the
Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, ); English tr. Discipline and
Punish. Birth of the Prison, New York, N.Y.: Vintage, ); G. R. Scott, The History of Corporal
Punishment. A Survey of Flagellation in Its Historical, Anthropological, and Sociological Aspects
(repr. London: T. Werner Laurie, ). On sensationalism and the great emotional response
to public suffering in city streets, see A. Ademollo, Le annotazioni di Mastro Titta carnefice
romano () (Sala Bolognese: Forni, ); A. Panico, Il carnefice e la piazza (Naples: ESI,
); G. Romeo, Aspettando il boia. Condannati a morte, confortatori e inquisitori nella Napoli
della Controriforma (Florence: Sansoni, ); L. Cajaini, ‘Pena di morte e tortura a Roma
nel settecento’, in L. Berlinguer and F. Colao (eds), Criminalità e società in età moderna
(Milan: Giuffrè, ), pp. -; L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale,
pp. ff. A. Pastore observes that: “The educational aspect of a form of justice able to
prevent crime was based on, and confirmed in, authoritative scholarly references: as the
jurist Giovan Battista De Luca wrote, “human punishment is inflicted as a medicine to
maintain peace and tranquillity - so as to hold men back from crime - , rather than as a
cure for a crime which has irrevocably been perpetrated” (Crimine e giustizia in tempo di
peste nell’Europa moderna (Rome-Bari: Laterza, , p. ).
. Cf. C. Cohn, The Trial and Death of Jesus (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, ). On
the specific aspects of crucifixion as a method of carrying out the death penalty compared
with other cruel practices, see D. J. Halperin, ‘Crucifixion, the Nahum Pesher and the
Rabbinic Penalty of Strangulation’, Journal of Jewish Studies, XXXII (), -.
. For a complete picture of the American context, Zimring links the death penalty
to the historical and traditional question of the ancient punishment of lynching, carried
out by the guilty party’s community: more particularly, he observes that the current death
sentence is the direct descendent of the lynching of the past as well as a tradition of private
justice in the hands of vigilantes, at least where this is still present in the local culture
(The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment). Certainly this is an unusual position,
perceived by the writer on the basis of the governmental dualism represented by the home
States and the Federal State. This asynchrony between the two parallel and sometimes
conflicting legal powers creates distrust in citizens towards the Federal Government and
privileges the role of the “domestic” justice of the home community, where law and order
are maintained by the so-called vigilantes, i.e. those who protect the Community by means
of immediate and harsh action. Reflection on these actions and the disruptive effects that
American criminal procedure has on the legal heritage of the American legal system is
particularly meaningful in M. Donini, ‘Antigiuridicità e giustificazione oggi. Una “nuova”
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institution of the State is at the centre of things, the death penalty is
the most effective instrument to show the exercise of power. In this
way, the value of the human person survives only as part and parcel of
the overall system of values meant to bolster the State. Secondly, it is
justified by the cultural roots of a people. If the experience of a nation
is that of making war or is rooted in feelings of hostility or defence
against the hostility of other countries, it is natural to consider that
death will make up part of the cultural experience of that nation. In
that case, the system of values responds to much more pragmatic and
concrete choices, so that the centrality of life cannot be a conditioning
element, and the priority of a need, rejecting humanitarian concerns,
satisfies the demands of the State order. A general model of hostility
becomes standard, which anyway represents an internal contradiction
to the legal system, in which the “external enemy” finds his perfect
counterpart in the “internal enemy” of the State to be neutralised and
dogmatica, o solo una critica, per il diritto penale moderno?’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.  (),
-, where he refers to F. E. Zimring (). On the double system of Government see
M. Teodori: “America has a dual legal system: federal, administered from Washington, and
State, in fifty different versions. An Italian finds it difficult to understand how the death
penalty can exist in only a few States and how the President of the USA can reply that
the issue is not within his province. This depends on the fact that capital punishment is
regulated differently in the fifty States, so only the governor of the State is able to grant a
pardon or suspend punishment” (Raccontare l’America, p. ). Teodori elsewhere observes
that: “It is equally execrable, as well as inexplicable that the death penalty still exists in
the legislation of many States, even if it is enacted with varying degrees of frequency and
cruelty. This terrible vestige of the pioneering tradition when the Americans carried out
summary justice on true or alleged criminals, is very slow to die” (Benedetti americani.
Dall’Alleanza Atlantica alla guerra contro il terrorismo, Milan: Mondadori, , p. ).
. The fact that the death penalty is in strident contradiction with the values of the
American constitutional order is now widely recognised, but the problem remains unresol-
ved, as shown by F. E. Zimring. Zimring points out that the debate on the death penalty
is the result of the clash between two incompatible sets of values, which cannot coexist.
On the one hand, capital punishment is incompatible with a fundamental principle of
American culture. On the other hand, ending the death penalty is tantamount to violating
another cultural tradition which has deep roots in the country’s history. Therefore, any
important development concerning the impossible coexistence of these systems of values
requires a change in deep-rooted cultural traditions (The Contradictions of American Capital
Punishment).
. E. Ferri, ‘Pena di morte e difesa dello Stato’, La Scuola positiva, VI (), .
. The concept of war “by the nation against a citizen” was already well known and
lucidly expressed by Cesare Beccaria. Cf. also J. Sèmelin, Purifier et détruire. Usages politiques
des massacres et genocides (Paris: Seuil, ); Engl. tr. Purify and Destroy. The Political Uses of
Massacre and Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, ).
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disabled through the death penalty. The issue of dichotomy refers
to the theoretical study of Carl Schmitt, who had drawn a precise
picture of the political importance of the concepts of feud and hostility
which, when applied to the criminal law, become rationally concrete
in the different choice of penalties that a State uses to face the threat
of crime. It should be added that the typical model of hostility to
the system has been updated to become the new “citizen-enemy”
binomial; but above all we should emphasize the singular position
of one who becomes the “enemy of criminal justice”. This attitude
places him outside the established system, causing a marked tension
between freedom and security, whose consequences can lead to the
loss of the guarantees of the rights of the individual. The solution is
inevitably to neutralise and render the dangerous person innocuous
at all costs. This is the height of the extreme contradiction within
the rule of law, which demands particular flexibility in the system of
crime control, in perfect harmony with the choices dictated by a firm
and certain pragmatism. Rousseau, as we have already said, placed
. G. Jakobs, ‘Diritto penale del nemico: un’analisi sulle condizioni di giuridicità’, in A.
Gamberini and R. Orlani (eds), Delitto politico e diritto penale del nemico. Nuovo revisionismo
penale (Monduzzi: Bologna, ), pp. -; F. Resta, ‘Nemici e criminali’. On this question,
cf. V. Mathieu: “The dividing line between war and law thus depends on the action of those
who want war, not those who want law: and it is well to take note” (Perché punire, p. ).
For an important discussion of this complex subject, see M. Pavarini, ‘La giustizia penale
ostile: un’introduzione’, Studi sulla questione criminale (new series of Dei delitti e delle pene),
 (), -; M. Delmas-Marty, ‘Le paradigme de la guerre contre le crime: lègitimer
l’inhumain’, RSC,  (), -. This idea recalls the events of a well-known period in the
history of Italian justice, cf. F. Colao, Il delitto politico tra Ottocento e Novecento. Da “delitto
fittizio” a “nemico dello stato” (Milan: Giuffrè, ).
. C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, ). It is worth pointing out here that the concept of contrast does not emerge
only in Italian criminal legislation on punishment, but the essence of hostility is present
also in the concrete execution of punishments based on detention, as shown by L. Delli
Priscoli-F. Fiorentini, ‘Pericolosità sociale e diritto penale del nemico’, Riv. pen.,  (),
-.
. A. Aponte, ‘Jakobs, il diritto penale del nemico e il “caso colombiano”’, p. , who
significantly entitles section  of his work “Diritto penale del nemico vs diritto penale
del cittadino: il delinquente giudicato all’interno del patto sociale”. Cf. also G. Fiandaca,
‘Diritto penale del nemico. Una teorizzazione da evitare, una realtà da non rimuovere’,
in A. Gamberini and R. Orlandi (eds), Delitto politico e diritto penale del nemico (Bologna:
Monduzzi, ), pp. -.
. W. Sofsky, Das Prinzip Sicherheit (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, ).
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two substantially different categories on the same plain, that of the
criminal and that of the belligerent enemy, aligned by the rule of a
fictitious state of war, but useful to justify trampling underfoot the
rights of the individual; more particularly, Rousseau maintained that
the proceedings and the judgment were the proof and the declaration
that “the criminal had broken the social contract” and, thus, that he
was “no longer a member of the State”.
In reality even at the turn of the nineteenth century, the classifi-
cation of the delinquent as “enemy” was entering criminal doctrine,
underlining the need to resort to the same means of neutralisation
that are used in formalised wartime conflict. The loss of the status of
“citizen” and member of society due to the evident violation of the so-
cial contract would make for a slide towards a concept of permanent
war against crime, and from there the adoption of the death penalty be-
comes necessary to the need for defence. On this, Garland observes
that if the criminology of everyday life downplays crime, identifying
it as a normal event, the criminology of the rest re-dramatises it, de-
scribing it in emphatic terms, judging it as a catastrophe, and making
use of “military and defensive metaphors”.
This theoretical model still appears rooted in the American penal
system, which not even the cultural changes of a mature democracy
have been able to overcome: in fact, the delinquent is seen as an
enemy bound to lose on the battlefield of the war on crime, one who
deserves this end more so than those who fall in other battles. As
Zimring observes, all these convictions are compatible with the idea
of using the killing of a condemned man as a just punishment for
criminal behaviour.
The purpose of deterrence is the leitmotiv that weaves its way
. J. J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, bk II.
. D. Tafani, ‘Kant e il diritto di punire’, p. ; T. Schmalz, Das reine Naturrecht
(Königsberg: Nicolovius, ).
. D. Garland, The Culture of Control. Crime and Social Order in Contemporray Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ).
. See F. E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment. As observed
by M. Donini: “coming to the system of sanctions, suffice it to refer to two exemplary
institutions: the death penalty and the other penalties geared towards definitive exclusion
from society, like the American criterion of the third strike” (’Diritto penale di lotta’, Studi
sulla questione criminale, new series of Dei delitti e delle pene, , , -).
 The right of a state to punish by death
through the political culture of the United States of America. As
Federico Stella acutely observes:
Now, I challenge anyone to show that sentencing an individual to
obtain a general deterrent or, if we prefer, general prevention in all
its forms, does not constitute an unheard violation of Kant’s maxim.
It is extremely surprising that the vast majority of criminal lawyers
anchored to the idea of the individual and in whose mind the chimera of
general prevention continues to grow have never even stopped to think
that in this way democracies undermine one of their mainstays and
lay the ground for the spread of a logic that has been, is now, and
may be in the future, a source of utmost grief, extreme evil, and such
atrocious injustice as to challenge the very essence of democracy.
This is what amply justifies the so-called “American exception”
which does not constitute an exception to the principle of constitutio-
nal democracy, but embodies a specific cultural and ideological choice
so that a nation may be recognised as the only one able to guarantee
peaceful co-existence and at the same time ensure the defence of
institutional integrity. It is claimed that the defence of “civilization”
can also lead to the abandonment of “civilized” behaviour, throu-
gh an initial but essential ideological operation, represented by the
“dehumanisation of the enemy”.
Among the various justifications is the question of the “crimen
laesae maiestatis”, in the dual guise of the protection of the “security
of the State” and the betrayal of the sovereign values expressed by
. The National Research Council (U. S.) has sustained that the studies available up to
that moment () provided no useful and unequivocal proof concerning the deterrent
effect of the death penalty (Deterrence and incapacitation).
. F. Stella, La giustizia e le ingiustizie (Bologna: Il Mulino, ), p. .
. For a lucid reflection on loyalty to the system and above all to the fundamental
values of civil co-existence in the United States, see A. Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Cf.
also: S. M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword (New York, N.Y.: Norton,
); J. Simon, Governing Through Crime. How the War Transformed American Democracy and
Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, ). In the United
States the debate on capital punishment goes hand in hand with that of the mental capacity
of the criminals. Useful on this theme is the cultural issue of the relationship between
psychiatry and criminal law raised by M. Foucault, Moi, Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère,
ma sœur et mon frère (Paris: Gallimard, ); Engl. tr. I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My
Mother, My Sister and My Brother (Harmondsworth: Penguin, ).
. N. Elias, Il processo di civilizzazione. Potere e civiltà (Bologna: il Mulino, ).
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the ruling authority. The death penalty thus becomes one of the
requirements that must be satisfied to achieve full recognition of the
legitimacy of a State and its right to govern when faced with dangerous
hostility considered potentially able to disrupt the established order.
Once again the central idea of Cesare Beccaria is wholly confirmed
by modern cultural criticism as well as the passage of time. A modern
perspective is offered by Emile Durkheim, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Da-
vid Garland. This new idea is in reality the thematic adaption of a
traditional one whose authentic roots are to be found outside the field
of law, in a territory where if a jurist is to find his conceptual bearings
he must be conscious of the fact that the death penalty can be justified
only by the purpose, by the ultimate ends dictated by political choices
at the service of the system, and neither the options pertaining to
criminal policy nor strategic legislative policies to control crime rates
are of any importance and still less so the virtuous connotations of
the rule of law.
. This complex issue has, as always, been taken up by M. Sbriccoli, Crimen laesae
maiestatis. Il problema del reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna (Milan:
Giuffrè, ), in particular from p.  and p. ff. The author reiterates the concept in
M. Sbriccoli, ‘Giustizia criminale’, when he states that “This concept rests on a shift in
the importance from the penal point of view of an act or behaviour from ‘damage’ to
‘disobedience’, which constitutes an extension of the model of the political offence to all
significant criminal acts” (p. ).
. Naturally, the hostility must be politically and legally sanctioned; it should focus
on the deterrent and dissuasive aspect of the punishment, with a view to prevention in
the broadest sense: “The administration of Barack Obama, the President of the United
States seeks the death penalty for the five terrorists charged with the attacks on the twin
towers and the Pentagon. Announced today in Washington by the US Attorney General
Eric Holder. Announcing that all five terrorists imprisoned at Guantanamo (including
the “mastermind” Sheikh Khaled Mohammed) will be tried “by an impartial jury” in
Manhattan, a few blocks away from Ground Zero, Holder stated that for this type of crime
the USA envisaged the death penalty” (http://www.ansa.it/). Cf. also H. Popitz, Phänomene
dar Macht. Autoritat, Herrschaft, Gewalt, Technik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, ).
. Cf. E. Durkheim, L’éducation morale (Paris: Alcan, ); R. Dahrendorf, Law and
Order (London: Sweet & Maxwell, ) (Dahrendorf observes that impunity, or the syste-
matic softening of sanctions, connects crime with the exercise of authority); D. Garland,
Punishment and Modern Society.

Chapter VIII
The respect of human rights
as a form of cultural delegitimisation
of the juridical basis
of the death penalty
In the cultural stratification supporting the death penalty, especially
in the American system, its purpose is best expressed in a clearly ri-
tualised context. The whole conceptual framework accompanying the
political or juridical aim of the death penalty is marked and represen-
ted by a veritable ritualism, whose protagonists, through vengeance,
become participants and public witnesses of a message, i. e. that every
crime will be unfailingly followed by its punishment.
If, as would appear possible from the evidence, with the passing of
time, the conceptual gap between the “basis for” and the “purpose” of
the death penalty has continued to increase, closure has been brought
to the debate on the juridical basis of the death penalty as a possible
punishment envisaged by the State (naturally this is true for all those
nations that maintain capital punishment in their legal tradition), by
the centrality of human rights. It is also authoritatively posited that
the second transformation was the new consideration of the death
. See G. Jellinek, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (; New
York: Henry Holt, ); N. Bobbio, ’La rivoluzione francese e i diritti dell’uomo’ (),
now in L’età dei diritti, pp. -; G. Vassalli, ‘Costituzione, sistema penale e diritti
dell’uomo’ (), in Ultimi scritti (Milan: Giuffrè, ), pp. -; G. Oestreich, Geschichte
der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten im Umriß (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, ); C.
Amirante, F. Rubino, ‘Diritti umani e pena di morte. Una riflessione preliminare’, Crit. del
dir., - (), -; F. Mantovani, ‘La proclamazione dei diritti umani e la non effettività
dei diritti umani (Accanimento contro la vita o cultura della vita?)’, Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen.,
 (), -. Reference to human rights calls into play a particularly reliable new and
modern criterion and a model of legitimation which binds the system, according to N.
Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ). Cf. also M.
Flores, Storia dei diritti umani (Bologna: Il Mulino, ).

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penalty as a violation of human rights to be banished in all civilized
States. This international principle, stated in Protocol nr.  (), has
become the basis “of anti death penalty evangelism” throughout the
world.
An illustrious Italian example is the parliamentary intervention of
Enrico Pessina during the work preparatory to the Zanardelli Code of
:
The desire to transfer the principles of an enlightened liberalism
to the code may be seen in the defence that he (Pessina) made of the
abolition of the death penalty, of the characteristics (including that
of re-education) that punishment must have, and the requirement
that the defence of the State not be at the expense of the fundamental
rights of the citizens. It is no coincidence that his speech requesting
the assent by the Senate to the Zanardelli project began with a studied
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The subsequent republican Constitution in force today categorical-
ly and definitively stated in its preceptive and unalterable section that
“The Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable human rights,
be it as an individual or in social groups expressing their personality”.
The debate, then, shifts once again from the field of law to the
political issue of fundamental human rights, where the right to life
of the human person is placed higher in the hierarchy of values than
the power of the State to kill. This is a decided and premeditated
. F. E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment.
. M. Sbriccoli, ‘Dissenso politico e diritto penale in Italia tra Otto e Novecento. Il
problema dei reati politici dal “Programma” di Carrara al “Trattato” di Manzini’, Quaderni
fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno,  (), -, containing the result of
the debate in the Senate of the Kingdom and in particular the speech by Enrico Pessina
on  November , in Lavori parlamentari del nuovo Codice penale italiano. Discussione al
Senato (from  to  November ), Turin, , from p. .
. The profound contemporary link between the rejection of the death penalty and
the respect for human rights and the dignity of the person was reiterated in an important
document signed by all the Italian academics specialising in criminal law in the ‘Document
for the Abolition of the Death Penalty throughout the World’ drafted on the occasion of the
“Fifth Centenary of the institution of the first teaching of criminal law (-)” at the
University of Bologna, and published with a comment by S. Canestrari in L’Indice penale, 
(), pp. -: “A document reiterating the absolute condemnation of the death penalty
and the need for commitment to law and criminal process based on respect for human
rights and the dignity of the person” (p. ).
. For more on this subject, see L. Ferrajoli, Diritti fondamentali (Rome-Bari: Laterza,
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change of strategy by the abolitionist movement, whose effects will
be contextualised in a much broader juridical perspective. In fact, all
this means that the subject of the juridical foundation of capital pu-
nishment can no longer be considered central to any reflection on the
justification of the death penalty along the spectrum of the different
theories of punishment. It becomes pointless to debate whether it is
theoretically justified from the retributional point of view or from that
of the generalised preventive profile of the right of a State to condemn
to death, because the reasoning that validates it is beyond the range of
the debate on criminal punishment, as is the consequence of criminal
responsibility which is only a premise for the application of a measure
to safeguard the system.
The problem on the other hand is deeply rooted in the context of
the political act, as is confirmed by the American experience, where
the legislative aspect exists in an institutionally dissociated context,
i. e. between State legislation and Federal legislation. An element
that distinguishes the death penalty from other violations of human
rights committed by States, such as torture and the persecution of
political opponents, is that their governments openly claim the right
to carry out the death sentence. Nor does the Federal Constitution
); S. Tzitzis, ‘Droit du morte et droits de l’homme’, Rivista internazionale di filosofia del
diritto, LXVII (), -.
. The subject of politics raises its head again and this time seeks a new conceptual
direction in a period of the globalisation of rights, and the new dimension opens up to the
possibility of establishing principles and values to create a different intercultural political
order; on this O. Hoffe emphasizes that a criminal law bound to the principle of human
rights becomes part of a theory of the State based on the idea of citizenship (Gibt es ein
interkulturelles Strafrecht? Ein philosophischer Versuch, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ).
In this process of rethinking concepts and rights through the prism of human rights, the
concept of human dignity occupies a new position, as underlined by M. Kaufmann (Diritti
umani, in der Reihe, Naples: Guida, ), p. . Also the Magisterium of the Catholic
Church, despite the reserve of canon law and the catechism, increasingly emphasises the
human right to life as inalienable, relating it directly to the concept of “human dignity”.
Dignity thus becomes the fulcrum for all questions relating to human rights that gives
meaning, albeit from another point of view, to the distinctive characteristics of the right to
life. Cf. the speech by Pope Benedict XVI at the General Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for
Life on th February : “The recognition of human dignity as an inalienable right is
founded primarily on this law, which is not written by a human hand, but is engraved in
human hearts by God the Creator. Every juridical order is required to recognise this law as
inviolable and every individual is called to respect and promote it”.
. F. E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment.
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prevent it, as the eighth amendment only regulates the nature and
procedural form of the application of the death penalty: “excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted”. In this way it is
in any case the method and not the type of punishment in itself
which must conform to the requirements of the constitution, and
it is no surprise that, in , the Supreme Court declared capital
punishment as it had hitherto been applied unconstitutional; nor is it
surprising that each of the Justices making up the august bench felt
the need to present a ‘doctrine’ on the matter, with the result that
nine different opinions were produced.
The modern tendency to widen the sphere of the absolute value of
human rights started with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
th December . However, at the centre of the juridical reflection
is the point that in none of the provisions of the Declaration is the
death penalty expressly prohibited. Indeed, in Art.  it was deemed
appropriate to resort to a “no mention” strategy, thus emphasising the
right to life, but without prohibiting the right to suppress life as a form
of punishment. During the eighties, the debate in Europe explores
another field of investigation whereby the death penalty represents a
particular form of torture, expressly prohibited by the international
Treaties including the European Charter. Conceptually, it may appear
somewhat difficult to understand what the relationship between the
right to life and the right not to be subjected to suffering and pain
might be. Nevertheless, the thorny question regards the period that
the person condemned to death must wait, even decades, so long as to
constitute a state of permanent, inhuman and unjustifiable suffering,
in the form of a rite to be carried out.
. R. Gambini Musso (ed.), Il processo penale statunitense. Soggetti ed atti (Turin:
Giappichelli, ), p. .
. See the excellent historical contextualisation by M. Flores, Storia dei diritti umani.
The debate around the predominant question of the unconditional respect of human rights
also arises in other fields. The latest to address this issue taking as his starting point the
brilliant insight of examining the relationship between justice, the law and the economic
system of globalisation is Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Harmondsworth: Penguin, :
cf. in particular chapter XVII).
. International public opinion was particularly touched by the news of the  years’
wait of G. W. Hathorn, Dead man walking. La mia voce dal braccio della morte (Marina di
Massa: Edizioni Clandestine, ).
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Not surprisingly the question of human rights obliged the Ame-
rican judiciary to pronounce on the legitimacy of the death penal-
ty, which once again seized the opportunity to reiterate their anti-
abolitionist stance. It was in reality a question of detail rather than
the issue itself, i. e. whether the means used to execute prisoners was
in conflict with humanitarian values or, at least, in harmony with the
eighth amendment of the US Constitution. The definitive solution
was reached on  April , when the Supreme Court of the United
States in the “Baze vs Rees” judgment ( US) “declared the death
penalty carried out by lethal injection constitutionally legitimate”.
Once again, the question of how overshadows the question of if and
once more the question of the compatibility of the death penalty with
the principles behind the choice of admissible criminal punishments
is not addressed. In reality, there has been a reduction in the number
of cases of the application of the death penalty for certain categories
of criminal. These include persons with mental incapacity due to a
multiplicity of causes ranging from anomalous mental development to
serious learning difficulties, or else the inability to form relationships,
thus making them unable to live normally in society.
Only political choices, seeking a difficult balance between the
powers of the State (i. e. between the powers of the individual State
and those of the Federal State), are of use in determining whether
or not it is opportune to keep the death penalty. As observed by
Zimring, the image of closure and its political manipulation protect
the death penalty from the fears associated with the excessive use of
. Here emerged the paradox represented by the ‘humanitarian techniques’ introdu-
ced by the United States in carrying out the death penalty; ‘technical’ solutions which do
not inflict further suffering on those condemned to death. For the various arguments on
the subject see F. E. Zimring, G. Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda
(New York, N.Y. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ). It should also be added
that on  June  the famous Furman vs Georgia judgment ( U.S., ) gave voice
to the abolitionist movement for the first time, focusing on the unreliability of the criminal
procedure for the investigation of crimes envisaging the death penalty. There followed the
stay of execution for all death row cases and an intense campaign in favour of abolition in
all States; on this, see J. Simon, Governing Through Crime.
. See C. De Maglie, ‘Presentazione’, to the Italian trans. of F. E. Zimring’s The
Contradictions of American Capital Punishment: La pena di morte: Le contraddizioni del sistema
penale americano (Bologna: il Mulino, ), p. .
. Thus in Atkins vs Virginia,  U.S.  (), for which see R. Gambini Musso
(ed.), Il processo penale statunitense, p. .
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government power. But in reality what is confirmed in the end is
that once again “the local governments feel that criminal justice is an
important means of government and that it makes no sense to leave
it to the sole initiative of the victims”. For these reasons there will
never be a logical symmetry between value-based choices concerning
the purpose of, or basis for, punishment and the political utility or
contingent purpose of applying the death penalty. If the key issue
becomes that of the reliability of criminal procedure in investigating
acts punishable by death, the issue of judicial error re-emerges from
the new perspective of human rights and the inviolability of life.
In this way, the values of justice and life are measured against
each other twice, and the principle already affirmed in the Federal
Death Penalty Act (federal law on the death penalty approved by the
Congress of the United States in ) is stated forcefully: that is, that
the death penalty creates an excessive risk that innocent people might
be executed, thus substantially violating the principle of a fair trial.
Setting aside any other consideration on the foundations or the
purpose of punishment which, as stated above, became prevalent in
the last century, the fact remains that from the politico-criminal point
of view, the death penalty has no power to dissuade. Its failure can be
seen both from the preventive and punitive perspectives. While the
death penalty exists, and States make large-scale use of it, considering it
to be of use in the fight against crime, it will be clear that it has had no
real effect in dissuading people from committing crimes punishable by
. F. E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment.
. M. Sbriccoli, ‘Giustizia criminale’, p. . Here we clearly see how the political
aspects prevail over those of criminal justice and over sanctions punishing the harm done
to the common good.
. Cf. F. C. Palazzo: “The death penalty is characteristic of eras when the State wishes
to emphasise certain values justifying the recourse to capital punishment to underline the
importance of the values to be safeguarded - as well as to mask the emotive, contingent
reasons of such a political choice” (’Pena di morte e diritti umani’, p. ).
. In the past, Mario Pagano warned future legislators against the uncertainty of the
penal system and the rash methods of obtaining evidence, all prerequisites unable to
guarantee justice in applying the death penalty. On this, see M. Pagano, Considerazioni sul
processo criminale (), with an introduction by E. Palombi (Naples: Grimaldi, ), p.
ff. It may be useful to recall what has already been said on the Report of the Council to
the Membership of the American Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty (April
, ).
. For all further references to case law, see H. Prejean, The Death of Innocents.
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death. And if crime rates show an increase, and not a reduction, in the
crimes for which it is envisaged, this means that the legislator needs
to change direction as far as punishment is concerned. It is therefore
true that the need for punishment depends on its effectiveness, and
that if a punishment does not achieve its purpose, it may safely be
said that it is not necessary.
As the starting point of his debate on State sovereignty, Rousseau
proposes a politico-institutional interpretation of the ineffectual nature
of punishment, attributing it entirely to the incapacity of Government:
more particularly, Rousseau argues that the frequency of punishments
is always a sign of weakness or laziness by government (since there is
not a single ill-doer who could not be turned to some good). Thus, he
adds, no-one has the right to kill, not even as an example, except in
the case of one whose life cannot be saved without risk.
In this way, the failure of the prevention principle leads only to
an asymmetrical form of retribution, a kind of retribution which,
however, aims only to assuage the desire for vengeance and, albeit indi-
rectly, the intent of vengeance cultivated within the cultural matrix of
a democratic and modern legal order. So much so as to demonstrate
that capital punishment finds no juridical justification for inclusion
. See G. Lombardi: “the frequency of punishment clearly showed the weakness
of governments, lacking in moral or intellectual consensus” (La pena di morte e il suo
fondamento, p. ).
. Cf. A. Blumstein et al. (eds), Deterrence and incapacitation, according to whom it is
the crime rate that affects the quantity and intensity of punishment. This happens when
State institutions overloaded with work due to the enormous number of crimes committed
become unable to handle them efficiently. If the same assessment criterion is applied to the
death penalty it is easy to infer its absolute inability to act as a deterrent or to intimidate.
. Cf. F. Guizot, Des conspirations et de la justice politique.
. J. J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, bk II, ch v. Although statistically marginal, the
data concerning the abolition of the death penalty in the Italian pre-unification States are
significant: “with the abolition of the death penalty in Tuscany in  by Pietro Leopoldo di
Lorena, capital offences diminished considerably; with its restoration in  by Archduke
Ferdinand, very serious crimes increased” (P. Rossi, La pena di morte e sua critica, p. ).
. A very interesting observation on this comes from L. Ferrajoli: “unlike its fabled
function of defending society, it is no exaggeration to say that the sum of the executions
carried out through history have cost humankind incomparably more blood, life and
mortification than all the crimes put together” (Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale,
p. ).
. For a return to a ‘terrorist’ dimension of the death penalty see E. von Hagg, Punishing
Criminals (New York: Basic Books, ).
 . The respect of human rights
among the punishments to be administered to those guilty of crime.
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